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Each year, 25% of the world’s output is produced by less than 5% of the planet’s population. The juxtaposition of these two figures gives an idea of the power 
of the American economy. Not only is it the most productive among the major 
developed economies, but it is also a place where new products, services and 
production methods are constantly being invented. Even so, for all its efficiency 
and its capacity for innovation, the United States is progressively manifesting 
worrying signs of dysfunction. Since the 1970s, the American economy has 
experienced increasing difficulty in generating social progress. Worse still, over 
the past twenty years, signs of actual regression are becoming more and more 
numerous. How can this paradox be explained? Answering this question is the 
thread running throughout the chapters of this book. 
Anton Brender and Florence Pisani, economists with Candriam Investors 
Group, offer the reader an overview of the history and structure of the American 
economy, guided by a concern to shed light on the problems it faces today.
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FOREWORD 
iewed from Europe, the strength of the US economy can elicit envy, 
especially in terms of the low unemployment rate it has long enjoyed 
and to which the country returned much more quickly than the EU 
in the years following the Great Financial Crisis. As this book shows, 
however, the use of fiscal and, more recently, monetary policy, although 
successful in rapidly re-establishing full employment, has done little to offset 
the increasing inequality that undermines both the country’s growth 
potential and its social harmony. 
Looking back over more than a century of political and economic 
developments, Anton Brender and Florence Pisani document not only the 
continuing economic leadership of the US, but also the increasing gulf 
between labour and capital that has left the US economy as polarised as its 
politics. They assert that this is accepted due to a cultural ‘aversion to public 
intervention’. But only by revisiting this stance can the whole of the US hope 
to prosper in a world of increasing international competition and continuous 
technological progress. 
This sweeping assessment of the US provides the European reader 
with a comprehensive background against which to assess developments in 
the EU, and in particular the eurozone, for example by comparing US 
monetary policy and its effects with the steps taken by the European Central 
Bank and their outcomes. Both the American and European economies have 
been subjected to broadly the same forces. The imbalances across the US 
economy noted by Brender and Pisani are reflected in similar imbalances 
affecting the EU, although, more often than not, they are ascribed to 
individual countries. 
I trust this book will encourage Europeans to seek a fuller 
understanding of the forces that are shaping the economies on both sides of 
the Atlantic today and in the future. 
Daniel Gros 
Director of CEPS 
Brussels, March 2018 
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INTRODUCTION 
ach year, a quarter of the world’s output is produced by a population 
accounting for less than 5% of the planet’s total. The juxtaposition of 
these two figures gives an idea of the power of the American economy. 
Not only is it the most productive of the major developed economies, it is 
also the place where new products are constantly being invented, as well as 
new services and new production methods, which, as we are daily 
reminded, then spread throughout the world. Even so, for all its efficiency 
and its capacity for innovation, worrying signs of dysfunction are 
progressively manifest. Since the 1970s, the American economy is 
experiencing increasing difficulty in generating social progress. Worse still, 
in the past twenty years signs of actual regression are becoming more and 
more numerous. How can this paradox be explained? Answering this 
question is the thread running throughout this book, which offers an 
overview of the history and structure of the American economy, guided by 
a concern to shed light on the problems it faces today. 
Chapter I recalls the trailblazing character of the economy and the 
original nature of the social model, which for more than a century inspired 
its formidable dynamism. At its core lies an aversion to public intervention 
that is much more deeply ingrained than it ever was in Europe. If the 
prosperity of all depends on the work of each person, nothing must be 
allowed to discourage individual effort; on the contrary, what each receives 
must depend on his own work alone – provided that work for all is to be 
found. Until World War I, this latter problem hardly ever arose: the 
exploitation of vast natural resources and later the industrial development 
of an immense territory called for an abundance of manpower that only a 
huge inflow of migrants could satisfy. The crisis of the 1930s, triggered by a 
financial cataclysm, brought about sweeping change. The distress associated 
with the rise in mass unemployment obliged the federal government to 
establish institutions which are still today at the heart of American social 
solidarity arrangements. At the same time, the deep depression in activity, 
which had been impossible to prevent or stem, drew attention to a new 
reality: the maintenance of full employment in an industrial economy is no 
simple matter. 
E 
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In the aftermath of World War II, the development of the American 
economy gathered pace and the sectoral composition of the income 
generated changed substantially (Chapter II). The growth of labour 
productivity, made possible by mechanisation and automation, was 
particularly rapid in the goods-producing sectors, where prices fell steadily 
by comparison with those of services. As decade followed decade, the share 
of domestic spending, especially by households, devoted to services – or, 
rather, a small number of them – grew constantly. Reflecting this tendency, 
the share of national income emanating from the tertiary sector became 
largely predominant. This ‘tertiarisation’ of income formation was further 
reinforced by the intensification of international trade: the American 
economy became specialised in services, while at the same time ‘de-
specialising’ away from the production of goods, or, to be more precise, 
manufactured goods. Following the agricultural sector, it was now the turn 
of the industrial sector to see its share of American value-added decline. For 
the most part, it was wages and not profits that were most affected. The 
result was that the evolution in the sectoral composition of employment was 
even more marked than for GDP as a whole and this helped to throw the 
American social model out of kilter. 
Contrary to a widely held belief, jobs in the tertiary sector are not, on 
average, less remunerated than those in industry (Chapter III). Admittedly, 
the sector includes many unskilled and relatively poorly paid jobs, but also 
many that are as well, or even better, paid than those in industry. However, 
to perform most of these jobs it is necessary to have skills that, unlike the 
situation that had long prevailed in industry, are difficult to acquire simply 
by experience. Technical progress and international trade, by sharply 
reducing industrial employment, have ‘freed’ a pool of manpower which, 
lacking the possibility of obtaining relatively well-paid service jobs, had no 
other choice than to accept the less well-paid ones. The result has been 
permanent downward pressure on the remuneration of the least-skilled jobs 
and a constant rise in inequalities. Aggravated still further by an increasingly 
uneven distribution of wealth, this increased inequality is nevertheless due 
less to technical change or international trade than to the aversion to public 
intervention. The underlying belief is that these factors are in themselves 
favourable for all and that no particular effort is required on the part of 
government to enable society to reap their benefits. 
The weakness of transfer mechanisms, both between the federated 
states and between individuals, as well as the reluctance to undertake public 
spending, have done much to deprive the federal government of the 
resources needed to finance efforts, necessary though these are, to adapt 
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structures for training and reskilling workers and reinvigorating regions or 
cities (Chapter IV). In the absence of such action, the government’s principal 
contribution has been to make efforts to give everyone the possibility of 
finding a job by keeping the economy as close as possible to full employment. 
In making these efforts, even if it cannot curb the rise in inequality, 
government can at least prevent the bottom levels of remuneration from 
falling further still. For several decades, fiscal policy has played a central role 
in this respect. From the mid-1980s on, however, the concerns raised by the 
increase in public borrowing have tended to reduce the federal budget’s role 
in the management of the economy, with monetary policy stepping in. 
Instead of relying on an increase in public borrowing to stimulate activity 
when the economy deviated from full employment, it was additional private 
borrowing that for many years performed this role. 
Monetary policy has turned out to be spectacularly effective in this 
respect (Chapter V). By manipulating more and more adroitly the level of 
interest rates, the Fed succeeded in preventing the American economy from 
diverging too far from full employment, despite the severe shocks 
confronting the economy: the scale of the bursting of the stock market bubble 
that took place at the beginning of the 2000s was comparable to that of the 
1929 crash but depressed activity only slightly. Moreover, during these 
prosperous years, monetary policy not only helped the economy to absorb 
cyclical shocks, it also averted a rise in unemployment at a time when 
countries in the rest of the world, through the rise in the oil price and the 
rapid growth of their exports of manufactures, were cornering an increasing 
portion of American domestic spending. The maintenance, against all odds, 
of relative full employment was hence made possible by continuous growth 
in private borrowing. This accumulation of debt was not accompanied, 
however, by the increased surveillance of the financial system, as it should 
have been. Here again, the aversion to public intervention inspired the belief 
that ‘market discipline’ would be sufficient to prevent any collapse on the 
financial markets. 
This belief turned out to be misplaced. The recession that began at the 
end of 2008, in the wake of the financial crisis, was to be the worst the United 
States had seen since the 1930s. It took ten years of emergency monetary 
policy to bring the unemployment rate back to its pre-crisis level (Chapter 
VI). And even then, the policy was unable to put the American economy back 
on a growth path that was sufficiently solid, if not to reduce inequalities, at 
least to keep the lowest wage incomes rising at a steady rate. The election of 
Donald Trump exposed the resentment and frustration this situation 
provoked in an increasing number of Americans. Unfortunately, his 
4  INTRODUCTION  
promises regarding restricting the openness of the United States to the rest 
of the world and cutting the taxation of corporate profits have little chance 
of restoring the American economy’s lost dynamism. 
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1. A TRAILBLAZING ECONOMY 
or more than a century now, the United States has led the way for the 
other industrialised countries. Not only has the trajectory of these other 
countries’ GDP per head – a crude but simple measure of an economy’s 
level of development – tracked that of the United States, but the structure of 
their activity has tended to converge with that of the American economy. At 
the same time, they have emulated its modes of production and 
consumption. However, the social model associated with this pioneering 
role played by the United States has remained virtually unique. In very few 
other countries has there been such a reluctance to accept state intervention. 
The ‘flexibility’ of the labour market has remained greater than in other 
countries. The incentive to work is reinforced by financial aids whose 
ambition is limited, while the scope of social insurance against the risks 
involved in a life without work (sickness, retirement, unemployment, and so 
on) is more restricted.  
This ‘model’, sometimes regarded as exemplary, has for several 
decades now shown increasingly clear signs of dysfunction. The crisis 
triggered a few years ago by financial laisser-faire was no doubt the most 
spectacular of these signs but not the most profound. Admittedly, the US 
economy is still one of the most productive, and in many sectors its 
companies are the most innovative. For almost 40 years now, however, the 
continuous growth in economic activity has ceased to fuel social progress. 
The standard of living of Americans occupying the lower half of the 
distribution of income has barely risen and inequalities in the distribution of 
income and wealth have reached a point at which the country’s social and 
political equilibrium could at some stage be placed in jeopardy.  
Before discussing the symptoms of this widening gap between the 
ever-increasing power of the American economy and the weakness of the 
social progress it generates, it is necessary to recall the major features of the 
American ‘model’ and how its cornerstones have come to be set in place. This 
model, currently in crisis, has nevertheless made it possible for this economy 
to follow an exemplary trajectory for more than a century.  
F 
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1.1 An exemplary economic trajectory 
Data compiled by Angus Maddison permit long-period comparison of the 
trajectories followed by certain developed economies. Graph 1 (left-hand 
side) shows for some of them the growth in their GDPs per head since the 
end of the 19th century. It can be seen that until World War II the growth rates 
were much the same, despite somewhat different starting points, and up to 
1939 the ranking had remained unchanged. Throughout this period, 
Switzerland remained in first place,1 constantly followed, neck and neck, by 
the United Kingdom and the United States and, somewhat further back, by 
France and Germany, also neck and neck.  
Graph 1. Evolution of GDP per head and population since 1870 (logarithmic scale) 
 
Source: Maddison Project (www.ggdc.net/maddison/maddison-project/home.htm, 2013 
version). 
The distinctive feature of the United States economy can be seen on the 
right-hand side of Graph 1, which shows that, while United States GDP per 
head had admittedly still not caught up with that of Switzerland, its 
population trebled during these seven decades whereas that of Switzerland 
rose by barely 60%. Between 1870 and 1939 the American population rose 
from 40 million to over 130 million inhabitants. There can be no better 
illustration of the origins of what has been called “the American dream”. The 
economy had become sufficiently dynamic for the hope of a better life to 
attract an ever-increasing number of immigrants, coming mainly from 
European countries or neighbouring Canada. During the period, the natural 
                                                   
1 The Swiss economy is used as a yardstick, despite its small size, because it was 
unaffected by the wars marking the 20th century. 
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growth of the population born in the United States was substantial – close to 
2% per year – but above all immigration was exceptionally large: between 
1870 and the end of the 1920s, despite strong natural growth of the 
population born in the United States, the proportion of immigrants in the 
American population remained particularly high at almost 14% (Graph 2). 
 Graph 2. Natural rate of growth of US population and share of foreign-born 
population, 1909-2010 and 1850-2010  
 
Source: US Census Bureau. 
The figures for the following period provide an even better illustration 
of the pioneering status of the American economy. Immediately following 
World War II, its GDP per head had caught up with that of Switzerland and 
the two economies were now sole joint leaders; it would take two decades 
for France, Germany and the United Kingdom to reduce the backlogs 
accumulated during the war. Starting in the early 1970s, GDP per inhabitant 
in the United States would finally move ahead of that of Switzerland. Now 
the unrivalled leader, the US economy would continue to increase its 
advance despite its faster population growth (between 1939 and 2010 its 
population would rise from 130 million to over 310 million). However, 
despite being more rapid than elsewhere, United States demographic 
growth was distinctly slower during this period than before the Great 
Depression, whose effects, combined with those of the war, contributed to a 
decline in the natural growth rate, while at the same time the flow of 
immigrants diminished significantly. By 1970, the share of foreign-born 
inhabitants in the American population had declined to 5% before beginning 
a slow rise to the levels seen in the first part of the 20th century. This 
movement was accompanied by a radical change in their continental origins. 
By the beginning of the present century, the vast majority were from Latin 
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America or Asia, with the share of those of European origin falling to less 
than 20%. There is one more notable feature: whereas in 1950 more than half 
the immigrants had acquired American nationality, the proportion was only 
half as great fifty years later.  
The American advance in terms of economic development can also be 
seen in the convergence between the sectoral composition of activity in other 
industrialised economies and that seen in the United States. As the gap 
between their development levels and that of the United States narrowed, 
the importance of primary sectors (mining and agriculture) and 
manufacturing tended to decline and that of private and public services rose, 
in each case tending towards American levels (Graph 3). The American 
primary sector, which accounted for 10% of GDP in 1950, was equivalent to 
no more than 5% from 1970 on, a proportion that would be reached in 
European countries three decades later. As for the proportion attained by 
manufacturing industry, this too in all countries, with the exception of 
Germany and Japan, has fallen below 15% of GDP. These tendencies are the 
reflection of a convergence between the other countries’ modes of 
production – and often also consumption – and those of the United States.  
Graph 3. Share of GDP accounted for by agriculture, manufacturing and services, 
1947-2016 (%) 
 
Notes: The shares of agriculture and manufacturing are shown on the left-hand scale and the 
share of the services sector on the right. The mining and construction sectors do not appear in 
the graphs (their shares were relatively stable during the period, with the exception of the UK 
mining sector, which rose strongly from the end of the 1970s before falling back again in the 
mid-1980s).  
Sources: Maddison Project and US Census Bureau. 
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1.2 An aversion to public intervention 
For several decades now, the American economy has been leading the way 
both for the most advanced economies and for others that have been rapidly 
making up their backlogs. However, the development of its economy has 
been based on a social order that still retains a somewhat original character, 
being in fact still deeply rooted in the values of the ‘founding fathers’ who at 
the end of the 18th century achieved the independence of the United States 
from British domination and ‘conservatism’. Their preference for non-
intervention was based on an ideology that differed from that which was 
prevalent in European countries. In particular, it was in opposition to the 
ideas underlying the order established by the British Crown, by its stress on 
individualism, the power of the people and laisser-faire. These ‘bourgeois’ 
values, espoused by the colonisers and pioneers who founded the economy 
whose astonishing expansion has been described above, have retained so 
great a power of appeal that more than two centuries later they still act as 
powerful forces tending to maintain American society’s adherence to this 
native form of laisser-faire. These forces favour reducing public intervention 
to the minimum, especially that of the federal government. The right to 
private ownership and the liberties this entails are enshrined in a 
constitution that despite frequent amendments has remained fundamentally 
unchanged for more than two centuries, with the Supreme Court ever-
vigilant to ensure that they are respected. The result has been extreme 
wariness of regulation of any sort and also of any excesses in the field of 
social solidarity that might reduce incentives to hard work and personal 
initiative. Only in cases of dramatic crisis or under pressure from 
overwhelming political will has this reluctance been momentarily eclipsed.  
The birth at the beginning of the 20th century of what was to become 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) provides an anecdotal, but 
revealing, illustration of this reluctance as regards measures aimed, for 
example, at regulating working conditions. Upton Sinclair’s classic novel The 
Jungle contains a description of the appalling conditions that prevailed at the 
time in the Chicago slaughterhouses. Sinclair, known for his socialist 
sympathies, was aiming to denounce the evils of unbridled capitalism. He 
was hoping to trigger a wave of public opinion in favour of the introduction 
of stricter working regulations and a minimum wage. The success of his 
novel did indeed lead to the setting up of a new organisation, but one only 
with the task of imposing respect for rules relating to food security and 
health. This makes it unsurprising that it was not until the Great Depression 
of the 1930s that the federal government laid the foundations for institutions 
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of a radically new type that would restrict what had previously been the 
almost unfettered freedom of firms in their dealings with their employees 
and provide at least part of the population with certain forms of insurance 
of which they had until then been deprived. The creation of these 
institutions, intended partly to repair the damage provoked by the crisis, 
seemed at the time sufficiently essential to override, for the time being at 
least, the penchant for non-intervention (Cowie, 2016). Not all of them were 
destined to last.  
The initial aim of the 1933 Banking Act (more generally known as the 
Glass Steagall Act) was to tackle the immediate causes of the crisis and in 
particular to prevent any future stock market crash from having similarly 
dramatic economic and social consequences. How could this be done other 
than by imposing strict operating regulations on the banks? Several 
American banks had in fact speculated hugely on a continuing rise in stock 
market prices (or lent large sums to other speculators, which amounted to 
the same thing). Account-holders throughout the country, fearing a collapse 
of their banks, rushed to withdraw their deposits. This rapidly converted a 
stock market crash into a major banking liquidity crisis, which in turn 
produced a drying-up of lending and a collapse of economic activity. The 
Glass Steagall Act was meant to draw lessons from this experience. In the 
first place, it would prohibit deposit banks from intervening on the stock 
markets, such intervention henceforth being reserved to investment banks. 
Second, it would provide for the introduction of a federal insurance system 
to which all the deposit banks would have to subscribe. Lastly, in order to 
avoid dangerous competition for deposits, remuneration of these deposits 
would be capped. These rules, laid down in the aftermath of the 1929 crisis, 
remained in place until the end of the 1970s, when the preference for laisser-
faire would again take the upper hand, clearing the way for sweeping 
financial deregulation. The social measures aimed at alleviating the 
consequences of the Great Depression would, at least in the case of those not 
aimed solely at providing immediate relief to the neediest, survive longer, 
remaining even today the cornerstones of the American social edifice. 
The social advances of the New Deal 
In the aftermath of the stock market crash, the number of unemployed did 
in fact rise dramatically and most American households, having seen the 
value of their savings melt away, found themselves facing the prospect of a 
miserable old age. To ward off this threat, the 1935 Social Security Act set up 
two social programmes: a federal system of old-age insurance and an 
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unemployment insurance mechanism. These were run by individual States 
but with finance provided by federal subsidies. The old age insurance 
programme – Social Security Old Age Insurance – came into operation on 
the eve of the Second World War. However, it by no means covered the 
totality of the workforce, as farm workers and domestic employees, most of 
them black, were ineligible. Having since become Old-Age, Survivors, and 
Disability Insurance (OASDI), it is commonly known simply as Social 
Security. With its financing provided by social contributions, it constitutes 
the public ‘pillar’ of the American retirement pension system, ensuring to all 
those who have held a job a pension guaranteed by the federal government 
of an amount that is a function of past contributions. As regards the 
Unemployment Insurance programme, it was not until 1937, when a 
Supreme Court decision confirmed its constitutionality that all states agreed 
to implement it. This programme, also financed by social contributions, pays 
those who have lost their jobs an allowance for a period that is usually 
relatively brief.  
The Great Depression did more than just trigger the introduction of 
these two major social programmes. This was because the high level of 
unemployment – the rate remained above 15% for practically the whole of 
the 1930s – had not only deprived many Americans of much of their income 
but had also considerably reduced the bargaining power of those with jobs 
and this in turn was inevitably unfavourable to the evolution in their 
earnings. In 1935, the National Labor Relations Act (better known as the 
Wagner Act) remedied this situation by instituting collective negotiation of 
working conditions and wages as well as setting out the conditions for strike 
action. Within each establishment, the principle became that of unique union 
representation of workers in dealings with the employers, while recourse by 
the latter to ‘unfair’ practices aimed at dissuading the putting forward of 
claims by the former was banned. The Act therefore considerably improved 
the bargaining position of workers in their dealings with their employers, at 
least in those sectors where it applied (yet again farm workers and domestic 
workers were not included in its coverage, nor were workers in the public 
sector). The adoption of this Act was made possible by the exceptional 
political configuration born out of the social drama of the Great Depression.  
The sit-down strike at the Flint General Motors plant would lead at the 
beginning of 1937 to the first union victory: after a 44-day strike, the workers 
finally obtained a wage rise of 5% -- not to mention the right to talk to each 
other during lunch breaks. This event gave instant legitimacy to the United 
Auto Workers (UAW) union and would be followed by a spectacular rise in 
the rate of unionisation: from 10% in 1936 to more than 30% in 1943. In the 
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post-war period, in 1950, the leader of the UAW, Walter Reuther, managed 
to obtain a further, highly generous agreement regarding health coverage 
and pension entitlement, as well as indexation of wages on the cost of living 
for workers not only at General Motors but also at Ford and Chrysler. Known 
as the Treaty of Detroit, this agreement constituted the UAW’s high-water 
mark. Little by little, following a period in which the War had enabled the 
unemployment rate to fall to its lowest level, there was now a rebalancing of 
political forces, this time to the detriment of the workers. As early as 1947, 
the Taft Hartley Act would amend some of the provisions of the Wagner Act: 
this time it was ‘unfair’ practices on the part of unions that were banned, 
while at the same time the conditions for strike action were tightened.  
As early as the beginning of the 1930s, another measure had initially 
been envisaged to ward off, more directly than through collective 
bargaining, the threat of a decline in the general wage level linked to a 
weakening of workers’ bargaining power, namely through the setting of a 
minimum wage at federal level. Similar measures had been under discussion 
since the beginning of the century but had been constantly rejected by the 
Supreme Court, which saw in them a limitation on the freedoms guaranteed 
by the Constitution. It was finally instituted in 1933, when it was set at $0.25 
per hour by the National Industry Recovery Act, one of the major planks of 
the New Deal. However, this too was declared unconstitutional and 
abolished two years later before being finally reinstituted in 1938 through 
the Fair Labor Standards Act, which at the same time set the working week 
at 40 hours and the remuneration of overtime at 1½ times the hourly rate. 
These stipulations were also referred to the Supreme Court, finally being 
declared in conformity with the Constitution in 1941. In the following 
decades, the minimum wage would suffer a fate similar to that of the Wagner 
Act: with the disappearance of the social urgency, preference for the free 
interplay of market forces would once again win the day. In the absence of 
regular revaluation by Congress, the minimum would gradually be eroded 
in real terms starting at the end of the 1970s, thus marking the end of upward 
legislative influence on wages.  
The war on poverty 
The other major social measures put in place by the federal government are 
more recent. These were introduced at another dramatic turning point in the 
country’s history, when President Kennedy’s assassination rocked American 
society to its foundations and blacks were granted their civil rights. When 
declaring his War on Poverty in his first State of the Union address in January 
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1964, President Johnson stated: “Unfortunately, many Americans live on the 
outskirts of hope – some because of their poverty and some because of their 
colour, and all too many because of both.” Alongside measures to provide 
immediate assistance, he announced others of a more long-term nature. The 
Elementary and Secondary Education Act was signed in 1965 and has been 
regularly renewed since then. This aimed to correct inequalities in the 
quality of the primary and secondary education received by children from 
poor families.  
Two other programmes, whose scale has constantly been increasing, 
were also introduced. These were aimed at mitigating another flagrant 
inequality, namely that affecting Americans’ situations regarding healthcare, 
which medical progress was making more and more costly. The situation at 
the time was that only those with a job (and their families) were entitled to 
benefit from health insurance plans of varying generosity sponsored by 
employers as part of collective agreements. Two federal programmes, 
Medicaid and Medicare, were introduced in 1965 by means of amendments 
to the Social Insurance Act adopted 30 years earlier. The Medicare 
programme provided health coverage for people over 65 years of age, while 
Medicaid, in theory at least, provided coverage for the poorest citizens. 
However, almost half a century later, several tens of millions of Americans 
were still without any insurance against health risks. The 2010 Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (better known as Obamacare) was an 
attempt to remedy this situation: it simultaneously obliged all Americans to 
subscribe to an insurance plan and provided subsidies to help those who 
could not afford to do so. A few years later, a Republican Congress and a 
Republican president, on the pretext of a preference for freedom to choose 
whether or not to be insured, decided to call this programme into question. 
There could be no better illustration of the restraining force that continues to 
be exercised by the aversion to public intervention ingrained in the minds of 
the early pioneers. 
1.3 Social progress running out of steam 
The economic expansion of the United States has hence been based on a fairly 
parsimonious social model in which public intervention has remained 
relatively limited. For most Americans of working age, retirement pensions 
and health insurance are ‘benefits’ whose importance depends on 
negotiation at the level of the individual firm and for which nothing is 
imposed by the federal government. The same is true of paid holidays and 
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sick leave. And while it is true that the federal government has introduced a 
mechanism for unemployment compensation, this is normally payable only 
for a few months. Finally, employers remain largely unrestricted in their 
freedom to lay off workers. In the private sector, they can terminate work 
contracts without notice or explanation, provided that their decision cannot 
be judged to be ‘unfair’ (only layoffs involving more than fifty people are 
slightly more constrained). According to a ranking established by the OECD, 
the American economy is among those with the lowest employment 
protection index. Frequently cited as an example, especially during the 
1980s, this ‘American model’ has since precisely this period been in 
difficulty. With hindsight, it can in fact be seen that, confronted by an 
economy whose structure has changed as development has proceeded and 
in which a considerable quantity of productive capital and hence of financial 
wealth has been accumulated, the country has been unable to transform a 
significant part of the gains in efficiency into social progress.  
An initial simple illustration of this point can be found in the average 
evolution of the purchasing power of American wage income: at a time 
when, as we have seen, the American economy was becoming the most 
advanced in the world, the evolution in the real hourly wage of workers in 
the private sector started to diverge from that of labour productivity. This 
divergence has in fact been increasing since the beginning of the 1980s, so 
that by mid-2017 it amounted to 25 percentage points. For almost four 
decades the average annual growth in real wages in fact barely exceeded 1%, 
as against productivity growth of close to 2%. This tendency is explained by 
the interplay of two forces of different kinds. The first of these relates to the 
warping of the distribution of private sector firms’ value added in favour of 
profits, whose share of the total rose by more than three percentage points 
between the early 1980s and the mid-2010s. The second relates to an 
evolution in relative prices that is also to the detriment of the purchasing 
power of wages, with the prices of goods and services consumed by 
American households tending to rise more rapidly than those of corporate 
value added. This distortion of relative prices, which has been especially 
noticeable since the early 1980s, has largely contributed to a widening of the 
divergences between the respective evolutions in productivity and wage 
purchasing power (Graph 4). 
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Graph 4. Evolution of real hourly wages and productivity* in the United States, 
1960-2017 (1960 = 100)  
 
* Output per hour for the non-farm business sector. 
Notes: The “real production wage” is calculated using the non-farm business sector implicit 
price deflator. The “real consumption wage” is calculated using the BEA personal 
consumption expenditure deflator (and not the BLS consumer price index). 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
By themselves, these observations are obviously not sufficient to show 
that since the beginning of the 1980s social progress has broken down in the 
United States. While the average purchasing power of private sector wages 
certainly grew more slowly than labour productivity, it nevertheless grew 
steadily. The same cannot be said, however, of the median wage: in fact, for 
almost 40 years the purchasing power of the wages of half of American full-time jobs 
has barely increased. This difference in the respective evolutions of the median 
wage and the mean wage reflects an increasing divergence in the rate of 
evolution of wages: the corollary of the fact that half of American wages 
grew more slowly than the mean is that the other half grew faster than the 
mean. In recent decades the gap between the lowest and the highest wages 
has continuously widened.  
Broadening the analysis to include not only the incomes Americans 
derive from their work but also the incomes obtained from their financial or 
property wealth makes no difference to this conclusion. Adjusted for the rise 
in consumer prices, the sum of these two components – personal income 
before transfers and taxes – received by American adults in the lower half of 
the income scale has shown no increase since the 1980s (Piketty et al., 2016). 
This is hardly surprising: the distribution of wealth income has shown even 
more inequality than has labour income and proceeded in a direction 
unfavourable to the lowest-paid workers (Box 1). The effects of this evolution 
have been all the greater in that the ratio of financial assets to the total wage 
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bill has almost doubled between 1980 and 2017, rising from 4.8 to 9.4! In the 
end, it is only the impact of public redistribution that seems to have 
permitted some slight progress in real terms in the level of Americans’ 
median disposable income. The taxes paid by those with remunerations in 
the bottom half of the scale have risen more slowly than the transfers they 
receive from the government. 
Box 1. Increasingly uneven income distribution 
The new World Wealth and Income Database (WID), created as a 
prolongation of the research by T. Piketty, E. Saez and G. Zucman, makes it 
possible to compare income distributions and to examine, in particular, the 
share of income accruing to the wealthiest beneficiaries. For present purposes, 
households’ taxable income has been used. This includes all sources of income 
as well as realised capital gains. Tax data have the advantage of taking better 
account of the higher incomes but, a contrario, lead to under-representation of 
households at the bottom of the scale (since these are not obliged to submit 
declarations). Furthermore, they are subject to tax optimisation practices and 
are not always perfectly homogeneous between countries. Their evolutions 
are nevertheless broadly similar to those obtained in the Distributional 
National Accounts prepared by Piketty et al. (2016). 
Graph 5. Income distribution in the United States, Germany and France, 1962-2014 
(%) 
 
* Fiscal income per tax unit, except for the right-hand side chart where fiscal income is per 
adult (with equal split within couples). 
Source: World Wealth and Income Database. 
Of the developed countries, it is the United States where the evolution 
in income distribution has been most spectacular, with the share of the top 
decile higher today than it was at the beginning of the 20th century and the 
share of the 0.1% highest earners now larger than that of the 50% earning the 
least (Graph 5)! 
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The end of the American dream 
The above remarks concern only the distribution of income in a given year, 
however. They say nothing about the income received by each American 
during a whole lifetime. The fact that the purchasing power of half of the 
remunerations received by wage earners has not risen in many years does 
not necessarily mean that, during these same years, there has been no growth 
in the incomes of half of the American people. The ‘American dream’ of 
social advancement was based precisely on the notion that any individual, 
even starting from the very bottom of the ladder, could hope to see his 
standard of living improve, and that of his children improve even more. 
Unfortunately, several indicators converge to suggest that it is indeed the 
foundations of this ‘American dream’ that are now being called into 
question.  
This expression was coined in 1931 by J.T. Adams, who defined it as 
“that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for 
everyone, with opportunity for each according to ability or achievement”. 
The immediate post-war situation provided support for this optimism, with 
Americans seeing their incomes increase rapidly throughout their career and 
achieving a better standard of living than their parents. Here again, the 1970s 
were to mark the end of an epoch: half of the men who entered the labour 
market at the beginning of the 1980s would have real income over their 
working life that was at least 10% below the median income of the preceding 
generation (Guvenen et al., 2017). Intergenerational mobility was set to fade 
substantially in the following decades. While in 1970 more than 90% of 30-
year-old Americans earned more than their parents, the proportion had 
fallen to only one in two by 2010. In the intervening period growth had 
indeed slowed down, but this slowdown was not as responsible for the 
decline as the increase in inequalities in the way the fruits of growth were 
shared (Chetty et al., 2016): intergenerational mobility fell because 
remuneration stagnated for workers occupying a large portion of the income 
scale.  
Another observation is just as disturbing: schooling and education, 
which had previously been a strong point of the American economy and a 
factor in upward mobility, became increasingly less so. As the decades have 
passed, the likelihood of obtaining a higher qualification than one’s parents 
has tended to decline. Not only has the entry rate to universities (and the 
success rate once there) for children from modest families remained much 
lower than for better-off families, these rates have risen much less rapidly for 
the former than for the latter (Bailey & Dynarski, 2011). The increase in 
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educational inequality has led to a decline in intergenerational mobility as 
regards education levels: the share of individuals with lower qualifications 
than their parents has risen from 10% in 1970 to almost 20% in the 1990s 
(Hout & Janus, 2011). This tendency is due to the levelling off of the high 
school graduation rate, which stopped increasing in the beginning of the 
1970s and has even fallen if one excludes from the official statistics holders 
of a certificate of General Educational Development (Heckman et al., 2010).  
The small increase in the number of those successfully completing the 
university cycle today now largely involves children from the middle and 
upper classes. Whereas the average level of education of current generations 
is higher than it has ever been, the risk that children from the more 
disadvantaged groups will fail to reach the level attained by their parents 
has never been greater. Above all, it is also possible that the continued 
widening of inequalities will further reduce this mobility in the coming 
years. Krueger (2012) has in fact shown that there was a positive correlation 
between the intensity of inequalities and the likelihood that a child will 
inherit the relative position of the parents. This relationship – known as the 
“Great Gatsby curve” and observed first at international level – seems to 
operate within the United States also: the regions in which income inequality 
is greatest are also those in which the mobility of children from 
disadvantaged families is least.  
The relative size of the American middle class – defined as the 
proportion of households earning between two-thirds and twice the median 
disposable income – is now smaller than anywhere else (Kochhar, 2017), 
partly as a result of the increase in the proportion of the most disadvantaged 
(those earning less than two-thirds of the median income)! Observations by 
two researchers (Case & Deaton, 2017) regarding mortality rates for 50-year-
olds are also alarming. They note, within this population, a spectacular rise 
in deaths due to drugs, alcohol or suicide: the death rate in this group has 
almost trebled since the beginning of the 1990s, exceeding 80 per 100,000 
inhabitants in the United States, whereas they have steadily fallen in most of 
the other developed countries. The authors also observe that while mortality 
rates for 50-year-olds have continued to decline in most developed countries, 
in the United States they have risen since the early 1990s for white non-
Hispanics. Here again, the populations most affected are the least qualified: 
the mortality rate for whites in the 50-54 group with no more than a high 
school diploma has substantially increased. Note, however, that while the 
mortality rate for 50-year-olds has continued to fall in the case of the 
Hispanic population and even more for the black population, for the latter it 
remained substantially higher than for the rest of the population (Graph 6).  
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Graph 6. Mortality for men and women aged 50 to 54, 1999-2015 and 1989-2015 
(deaths per 100,000)  
 
Source: Case & Deaton (2017). 
These symptoms suggest that the United States, while still the 
trailblazer in terms of the strength of its economy and its capacity for 
innovation, has now reached a social impasse. Following the rapid 
development the country has experienced, with its accompanying change in 
the composition of activity, the aversion to public intervention that was once 
a source of dynamism has become a cause of social disintegration. The 
evolution in the composition of demand for firms’ products, technical 
progress but also the greater openness to international trade have in fact 
transformed the nature of the jobs available, just when policies aimed at 
facilitating this transformation – or mitigating its consequences – remained 
particularly hesitant. It is the determinants of this transformation of the US 
economy into a ‘tertiary’ economy that will now be described, before going 
on to examine the consequences for employment and the formation of 
household income. 
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2. ‘TERTIARISATION’ OF INCOME 
etween the end of World War II and the beginning of the 21st century, 
the sectoral composition of American GDP underwent profound 
changes. While the public sector’s share remained relatively stable, the 
structure of private value added was considerably modified, with the share 
of GDP accounted for by the goods-producing sectors (manufacturing, 
construction, agriculture, mining) cut by half to less than 20% and that of the 
service-producing sectors increasing by more than 20 percentage points. This 
‘tertiarisation’, in which most of the other industrial economies also seem to 
be currently engaged, was already becoming discernible several decades 
ago. In the middle of the 20th century, Colin Clark [1940] noted, concerning 
the developed economies of the time: “As real income per head increases, it 
is quite clear that the relative demand for agricultural products falls all the 
time and that the relative demand for manufacture first rises, and then falls 
in favour of services.” While predictable, this evolution was nonetheless 
particularly marked in the United States and the aim of this chapter is to 
discuss the underlying determining factors. Two preliminary remarks have 
to be made, however: evolutions in relative prices have played a decisive 
role in the shift in the sectoral composition of value added; and this shift is 
due to the increase in importance of only a handful of service activities. 
A major shift in relative prices 
The change in the composition of national income has, in the United States 
as elsewhere, been in large part the reflection of the differentiated evolution 
in the prices at which firms in the goods and service sectors, respectively, 
‘sell’ what they actually produce, i.e. their value added. Between these two 
broad sectors, not only have there been great differences in technical 
progress but also in competitive conditions and in the intensity of demand, 
with the prices of value added in the goods sector falling considerably by 
comparison with those in the service sector (Graph 7). This distortion of 
relative prices on its own explains most of the decline in the relative importance of 
the goods sector in American GDP. As an illustration, between 1947 and 2016 
the value added of firms in the manufacturing sector, measured in volume 
this time, rose eightfold, i.e. almost as much as GDP, whereas the value 
B 
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added of those in the agricultural sector, also measured in volume, rose six-
fold. Clearly, the reality of the ‘volumes’ concerned may seem somewhat 
abstract, being the result, it must be remembered, of the efforts made by 
national accountants to take into account, period by period, the evolution not 
only in the quantities of the goods and services produced but also in their 
quality, i.e. the fact that a TV set produced today is associated with a 
‘volume’ of production that is considerably greater than that of a set 
produced fifty years ago. Even allowing for the possible imperfections of this 
accounting for improvement in quality, the above multiples, compared with 
an increase in population amounting to only 50%, nevertheless show that 
even after ‘tertiarisation’, the American economy continues to produce a 
massive amount of goods. The value of these goods has sharply declined, 
however, by comparison with that of the production of services. And it is in 
terms of value and not volume that the sectoral distribution of national 
income is determined. The tertiarisation of the American economy therefore 
reflects a change in the relative importance of the sectors in which the 
formation of profits and wages takes place: almost four-fifths of the income 
of firms and households active in the private sector are now derived from 
services, compared to only one-half in the aftermath of World War II.  
Graph 7. Relative evolution of goods and services sectors, 1947-2016 
 
Note: The “goods-producing industries” consist of agriculture, forestry, fishing, and hunting; 
mining; construction and manufacturing. The “private services-producing industries” consist 
of utilities; wholesale trade; retail trade; transportation and warehousing; information; 
finance, insurance, real estate, rental, and leasing; professional and business services; 
educational services, healthcare, and social assistance; arts, entertainment, recreation, 
accommodation, and food services; and other services, except government. 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
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The increased importance of a handful of tertiary sectors  
Of the service sectors generating this evolution, three on their own provide 
practically the entire explanation: health, finance and real estate, together 
with professional and business services (Graph 8). The sectors that enable 
goods, persons and information to circulate (trade, transport and 
warehousing, information and communication) have as a group maintained 
a virtually unchanged weighting for half a century: their value added today 
accounts for roughly one-fifth of all market services. Admittedly, the relative 
importance of both retailing and transport has fallen slightly and that of 
wholesale trade has remained stable, but the relative importance of the 
information sector has risen to such an extent that the income derived from 
these activities, which are increasingly interlinked as the result of technical 
progress, has, taking the group as a whole, risen at practically the same rate 
as GDP. 
Graph 8. Private service sectors’ shares of GDP, 1947-2016 (%) 
 
 
Note: In the left-hand chart, the “other private services” consist of utilities; educational 
services; arts, entertainment, recreation; accommodation, and food services; and other 
services, except government. 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
To identify the factors underlying this shift in the composition of value 
added to the detriment of the goods-producing sectors and in favour of 
certain components of the service sector, it is clearly first necessary to 
examine the evolution in the composition of demand for the output of 
American firms: given that the income of some is the expenditure of others, 
the fact that income formed in some of these sectors has increased may 
simply be due to the fact that American economic agents have changed the 
manner in which they spend their income. While it is true that final demand 
on the part of households and firms – consumption and investment – has 
indeed shifted in favour of services, this shift explains only part of the 
changes observed. Another major factor has been the evolution in inter-firm 
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relations: in the production of goods, firms are having increasing recourse to 
providers of services, the result being a rise in value added in the service 
sector at the expense of value added in the production of goods. These 
domestic factors do not suffice to explain the totality of the decline seen in 
the importance of the manufacturing sector. For this, a final factor has to be 
introduced, namely the increasing openness of the United States to the rest 
of the world, a tendency that has been accompanied by a continuous rise in 
the trade deficit and an increasingly marked international specialisation of 
the American economy in services activities.  
2.1 The role of household consumer spending 
Consumer spending by households is the main component of American 
domestic demand. Today it accounts for more than two-thirds of GDP, 
compared with only 60% at the beginning of the 1950s. In seven decades, its 
composition has undergone substantial changes, with the share of services 
rising by almost 30 percentage points and that of non-durables (food and 
clothing) falling by 27 points (Graph 9), while that of durable goods fell by 
only 2 points. The shift in relative prices referred to earlier played a 
particularly important role in this respect. Despite the spectacular evolution 
in the share of services in household spending, the ‘volume’ of the services 
consumed rose in line with consumption as a whole. 
A decline in the importance of purchases of consumer goods 
Since 1947, prices of goods, especially durables, have increased much less 
rapidly than those of services purchased by households (Graph 10). At a time 
when durable goods were declining slightly as a share of households’ 
spending, in volume terms their consumption of these goods has in fact risen 
distinctly faster than that of services, driven mainly by a spectacular growth 
in purchases of electronic and computer-related goods. The “recreational 
goods” of which they form part now account for a larger share of durable 
goods purchases than furnishing and household equipment and are 
approaching the level of automobiles. The impressive slump in the 
proportion of spending devoted to purchases of non-durables is explained, 
in part at least, by a growth in volume that is smaller than that of total 
consumption. The effect of this unfavourable tendency in terms of volume 
was compounded by the fact that the evolution in prices was also less rapid 
than for consumption as a whole.  
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Graph 9. Structure of American households’ consumption expenditures, 
1947-2016 (% of consumption) 
 
Note: Education services are included in “other services”: they amounted to 2.3% of total 
consumption and roughly 25% of the other services. 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Examination of the difference between consumption of food and 
beverages and of other non-durable goods is revealing. While in value terms 
the respective growths in spending on food and clothing were similar, those 
of the respective volumes differed considerably. Spending on clothing, as 
indeed on “other non-durable goods” (pharmaceuticals, cosmetics, etc.), rose 
much faster: since 1947, consumption of clothing items rose each year on 
average almost two points faster than that of foodstuffs. This decline in the 
share of foodstuffs was one of the foreseeable consequences of economic 
development; spending on clothing, as on “other non-durables”, seems on 
the other hand to have been less sensitive to development. While, as a direct 
corollary, services have been taking an increasing share of households’ 
budgets, the process in this case was also far from homogeneous: since the 
mid-1960s at least, the importance of spending on housing, transport and 
food services and accommodation has hardly changed; spending on health 
services, financial services and, to a lesser extent, leisure activities has 
steadily increased. For many of these services, however, it is important to 
bear in mind the methods used to evaluate consumer spending. 
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Graph 10. Relative evolutions of consumption in value and in volume, 1947-2016 
(divergences from total consumption, 1947 = 100)  
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Stability of spending on housing 
Spending on housing is today the largest item in household consumption, 
on level terms with health, accounting for roughly one-sixth of the total 
(Graph 11). It is important, however, to recall the manner in which national 
accountants deal with the “housing services” covered by this item. The bulk 
of the recorded spending – and hence also of the corresponding incomes – is 
‘fictitious’. The expenditure of households owning their dwellings is 
different in nature from that of tenant households: instead of paying rent, 
they have to deal with maintenance and repair work, pay real estate taxes, 
service loans, and so on. This spending, while covering the ‘housing service’ 
which they consume free of charge, also contributes to increasing or 
preserving the value of their asset. For this reason, the national accountants 
seek to include in the figure for consumption only the value of housing 
services consumed by the owning households. To achieve this, they impute 
to the households a rent, which is supposed to correspond to the one they 
would pay if they were not owner-occupiers (see Box 2). This ‘imputation’ 
makes it possible, among other things, to prevent an economy with a high 
proportion of tenant-occupiers from reporting a higher GDP than one with 
a lower proportion. Given that the proportion of owner-occupiers in the 
United States was around 64% at the beginning of 2017, almost two-thirds of 
the recorded consumption of housing services is ‘imputed’ consumption. 
The slight increase since the early 1960s in the share of consumption taken 
by rents – actual and imputed – stems in large part from an observed upward 
tendency in rents actually paid that was slightly faster than that of consumer 
prices; given the way in which imputed housing services are calculated, this 
rise contributed to the increase in the importance of imputed housing 
services in relation to households’ consumer spending.  
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Graph 11. Share of housing, financial services and healthcare in consumption, 
1947-2016 (%) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
Box 2. Imputed housing services in the American national accounts 
The housing services consumed by owner-occupiers are taken into account by 
means of an imputation corresponding to the rent that the owner would pay if he 
were a tenant (Mayerhauser & Reinsdorf, 2007). This imputed rent is estimated 
on the basis of surveys. A net rental income is then calculated as the difference 
between this imputed rent (the consumption of the housing service) and the 
actual expenditure by the owner-occupier household (repairs, interest on any 
mortgage loans, etc.).  
Graph 12. Imputed housing services in the national accounts 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
In reality as well as in the national accounts, only the real expenditure by 
the owner-occupiers will have an impact on household saving. When interest 
payments and maintenance expenditure increase, their savings will be reduced. 
A rise in imputed rents, on the other hand, will have no influence on their savings 
(Graph 12): the net rental income will increase by the amount of the rise in 
imputed rents. Since the mid-1990s, the consumption of housing services by 
owner-occupier households has risen faster than their actual expenditure; this 
disparity has been ‘corrected’ by the rise in their imputed income. 
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The increasing importance of financial services 
Between 1947 and 2016, the share of financial services in household 
consumer spending has, for its part, risen substantially, from less than 3% to 
almost 8%. This figure, too, includes imputed elements calculated by the 
national accountants in order to take into account the particular nature of 
financial intermediaries’ value added. It results in part from the interest rate 
spread they achieve by lending at rates higher than those at which they 
borrow. Given that, in relation to their income, the outstanding amounts of 
both households’ deposits and borrowing have risen, their imputed 
spending on financial services has also risen. From the 1980s on, the 
importance of the consumption of financial services also expanded under the 
impact of actual expenditure: fees of all sorts, expenditure related to credit 
cards, holding fees, portfolio management costs (including those payable by 
pension funds, etc.). All in all, the share of financial services (including 
insurance) in household consumption rose by more than five points in seven 
decades, contributing in no small part to the rise in the share of services in 
GDP. Despite containing a certain imputed element, this evolution reflects a 
genuine reality, corresponding as it does to a huge upsurge in financial 
operations related to the exponential growth observed in transactions of all 
kinds; at the same time, seen in “value” terms, it reflects households’ 
increased recourse to credit and to the services of third parties for the 
purpose of managing the financial wealth they have accumulated. 
Graph 13. Consumption of financial services, housing services and health services, 
1947-2016 (divergences from total consumption, 1947 = 100)  
 
Data source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
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… and of healthcare services 
The evolution of spending on healthcare is by far the most spectacular and 
the most factual. This, too, is a foreseeable consequence of economic 
development, given that medical progress and its diffusion, combined with 
an increase in life expectancy and ageing of the population, lead naturally to 
a rise in this form of expenditure. This rise has been particularly marked in 
the American case: in half a century, it has more than tripled as a proportion 
of total consumption. Here again, prices have played a particularly 
important role (Graph 13), rising by an annual average of more than 5% in 
the past fifty years, compared with 3.5% for average consumer prices. This 
explains practically four-fifths of the increase in the share taken by 
healthcare.  
The way in which this healthcare spending is currently financed was 
drastically modified by the introduction of the two federal programmes 
referred to in the previous chapter. At the end of the 1950s households were 
bearing the burden of more than 70% of healthcare spending, the bulk of the 
remainder being paid for by private insurance plans set up by employers or 
subscribed to on an individual basis. At the beginning of the 2010s, the 
proportion of healthcare paid for by households had fallen to below 20% and 
the proportion paid for by private insurance plans was close to 35% 
(McCully, 2011). The two public programmes, Medicare and Medicaid, set 
up in the mid-1960s and which have steadily increased their scope since then, 
now cover a little less than half of households’ healthcare spending. Despite 
this progress, the United States today presents the special feature of being, 
of all the developed countries, the one in which the government’s 
contribution as a share of healthcare spending is the lowest but where 
healthcare spending in relation to GDP is by far the highest (OECD, 2015). 
The performance of the American healthcare system cannot on its own 
justify this high level, however. It is due also to the complex 
interrelationships between the various players in the system – doctors, 
hospitals, laboratories, public and private insurers – which are a source of 
substantial administrative costs, inefficiency, and even economic rents.  
2.2 The role of corporate demand 
Since the beginning of the 1950s, corporate investment as a share of GDP, 
ignoring cyclical fluctuations, has risen slightly. However, its composition, 
like that of household consumption, has shown a tendency which has also 
contributed to the tertiarisation of national income. Productive investment 
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can take widely differing forms. Some of these are strictly physical, such as 
factories, commercial premises, office space, or purchases of the machinery 
and equipment to be installed in the structures created. But other types of 
investment are ‘immaterial’, resulting from R&D, acquisition of software, 
build-up of intellectual property (scientific, literary, artistic). These 
immaterial investments have a much higher services content, notably of 
professional services, than do buildings or equipment. Their importance has 
increased considerably in recent decades, rising from less than 1% of GDP at 
the beginning of the 1950s to almost 4% in 2016. They currently account for 
roughly one-third of corporate investment, compared with less than 10% just 
after World War II. In volume terms, the evolution of these immaterial 
investments has been even more spectacular: between 1947 and 2016 they 
rose at an annual rate of over 6.5%, two percentage points faster than 
investment in equipment. This evolution is all the more remarkable in that 
their prices, after having moved in line with those of equipment, have since 
the beginning of the 1990s grown slightly faster.  
This rise in the prices of immaterial investment in relation to those of 
equipment may seem somewhat surprising. It is in fact due to a fall in the 
prices of software that was not as steep as for computer equipment. Here 
again, the decline in prices of durable goods stands out as one of the principal 
factors underlying the tertiarisation of the American economy. But it was not 
the only one. Many industrial firms showed a tendency to relocate the 
manufacturing process, especially for electronic and computer equipment, 
maintaining on US soil only the design and marketing activities. For this 
reason, some are now classified in the wholesale trade sector (Byrne et al., 
2013). In part at least, therefore, investment in the computer equipment 
produced by these firms is the source of US value added in services. 
The contribution of outsourcing to the intermediate consumption of 
services 
However, the role of corporate demand in this tertiarisation of the economy 
is far from being restricted to this shift in the pattern of firms’ investment 
spending. In recent decades, firms have also substantially modified the 
organisation of their production. On the one hand, they have outsourced an 
increasing proportion of tasks not directly linked to their main business: 
cleaning and maintenance and security are obvious examples, but 
accounting or IT functions have also been subcontracted to external service 
providers, while at the same time there has been increasing recourse to 
interim agencies. In parallel with this demand for corporate support services, 
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there has been an expansion of demand for professional services of a legal, 
scientific, financial or strategic nature, these services being supplied by 
consultants or firms specialising in these fields.  
This increasing recourse to outside firms for the provision of services 
of both low and high value added has been reflected in an increase in 
intermediate consumption of services: instead of paying wages directly – 
and having to provide the social benefits laid down through collective 
bargaining – to employees not directly involved in their main activity, 
businesses purchase services from specialised firms, as and when needed. In 
so doing they also concede to these outside firms part of their value added. 
The same takes place when, instead of immobilising their capital by 
purchasing the buildings or vehicles they need in order to function, they rent 
them from others specialising in such activity. Between the beginning of the 
1970s and the mid-1990s, purchases of services as a proportion of total 
intermediate consumption by firms producing either goods or services rose 
considerably and now stand at 65%. This tendency will be intensified in the 
future as the result of recourse to cloud computing, a possibility which in 
fact leads firms to purchase the external services rather than to increase their 
own hardware investment. All in all, the outsourcing, of which this 
consumption is the bookkeeping reflection, explains, for the most part, the 
rise in the share of GDP taken by professional and business services. It also 
partly explains a similar tendency in the real estate and finance sector.  
The forces tending to distort the structure of the various components 
of demand for the produce of American firms may in each case have been 
specific, but they nevertheless acted in the same direction, with an increase 
in the demand for services often at the expense of demand for goods. Taken 
together, these forces led to an increase in the share of value added of the 
three main groups of private services referred to at the beginning of this 
chapter. In addition, the relative stability as a share of GDP of public 
spending on goods and services was itself also accompanied by a decline in 
the proportion of purchases of goods by the state, linked in particular to the 
slump in the importance of public investment. The most dynamic 
component of public spending concerned the production of public services: 
at a time when the share of GDP taken by defence services was in steep 
decline (more than halving between the beginning of the 1960s and the 
middle of the 2010s), that of education services, after climbing during the 
1960s, subsequently stabilised at between 4 and 5 GDP points; activities 
relating to public order and safety showed steady progress, rising during 
these same decades from 1 to 2 GDP points. 
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2.3 The role of openness to foreign trade 
This rise in the proportion of services in domestic demand and production 
nevertheless fails to explain the most spectacular change, namely the 
collapse of the goods-producing sectors’ share of GDP. Admittedly, as 
shown earlier, for several decades the share of industrial products in 
domestic demand has steadily diminished. However, as a percentage of GDP 
it has fallen by only 12 points since the beginning of the 1960s, as compared 
with a larger fall of 20 points in manufacturing value added as a share of 
GDP. This contrast is the result of the increasing openness of the economy to 
imports from the rest of the world and the widening of the American 
external deficit that accompanied it, which in turn reflected continuous 
borrowing by US agents from the rest of the world, enabling the United 
States to spend more than it earned. An increasing share of domestic 
spending therefore had to be met through imports. The value of imported 
goods was all the greater in that, simultaneously with the opening up of the 
American economy to international trade, its own specialisation was also 
becoming tertiarised. It was in fact becoming an economy which, in its trade 
with the rest of the world, was a seller of services in order to purchase goods 
(Box 3). This new pattern of specialisation was reflected in increased net 
exports of services on the part of the United States, the result being that its 
net imports of goods increased even more than the widening of the current-
account deficit would have implied on its own. The upshot was that not only 
did the share of manufactures in US domestic demand decline, but an 
increased proportion of the demand for these goods was met through 
imports especially from low-wage countries. 
 
Box 3. Services: the key element in US international specialisation 
Starting at the end of the 1960s, the US balance of trade in goods and services 
deteriorated sharply, while at the same time its openness to the outside world 
was increasing (Graph 14). In relation to GDP, this balance nevertheless 
declined substantially following the financial crisis, the figure being halved 
between 2007 and 2016. While the balance on trade and services is 
increasingly in surplus, that on trade in goods is still showing a substantial 
deficit. 
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Graph 14. US exports, imports and trade balance in goods and services, 1967-2016 
(% of GDP) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis.  
The persistence and scale of the US current-account deficit partly mask 
the spectacular evolution in the specialisation of the US economy during the 
past half-century. A country whose residents spend more than they earn – as 
is the case for the United States – can perfectly well be in deficit on all items 
of its external current account and still enjoy comparative advantages in 
certain sectors and disadvantages in others. This can be shown quite simply 
by seeing which items are more (or less) in deficit than the average. The CEPII 
comparative advantage indicator makes it possible precisely to observe the 
evolution in a country’s strong and weak points in its international trade by 
looking at the contribution of each type of product or service to the balance 
on its current trade (by construction, the sum of all these contributions is equal 
to zero). The evolution in the international specialisation of the American 
economy in the past several decades emerges clearly, reflecting quite closely 
that in its productive system: more than ever, the US economy is today an 
exporter of services in exchange for goods (Graph 15).  
Graph 15. Comparative advantages and disadvantages, 1967-2016 (contributions to 
the balance of goods and services, % of total trade) 
 
Note: Business services include maintenance and repair services, insurance services, 
financial services, telecommunication, computer and information services and other 
business services. 
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis; US Census Bureau and authors’ calculations. 
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Detailed examination of the sectoral evolutions is also enlightening. The 
contribution of the capital goods sector, which had been the US economy’s 
strong point during the 1960s, has steadily declined (it should be remembered 
that this sector includes computer equipment); that of consumer goods 
(excluding cars) has followed a virtually parallel course, to the point of now 
becoming the economy’s weak point. The contribution of commodities, for its 
part, has followed the opposite course: inasmuch as energy dominates this 
item, the evolution in the oil price and the exploitation of shale oil explain 
why, after having been sharply negative during the 1970s, the contribution of 
commodities (including refined petroleum products) has ceased to be a US 
weak point – and could even in the future become a strong point if the oil 
price were to rise. 
Turning now to details of the contribution of various service activities, 
these show evolutions on a smaller scale but just as significant: the 
improvement in the contribution of the “travel” item – which includes, among 
other things, spending by foreign students attending American universities – 
has been remarkable, turning positive during the 1980s. The same is true of 
services to firms (including financial services) and, to a smaller extent, of 
income from intellectual property.  
All in all, the position of the United States in world trade in services has 
strengthened considerably. American firms not only in the finance and 
insurance sectors but also in manufacturing are the largest ‘exporters’ of 
services. The latter in fact receive substantial income from intellectual 
property and supply firms in the rest of the world with support services (for 
example, repair and maintenance). 
One final point deserves to be highlighted: the international role played 
by US firms goes well beyond their activity based in the United States itself, 
especially as regards services. Since the mid-2000s, sales of services by foreign 
affiliates of American firms have grown even more rapidly than those of US-
located firms. These sales do not appear in the figures for American exports. 
Unlike branches, these subsidiaries are in fact legal entities distinct from their 
parent companies and are treated as resident in the countries where they 
operate. Because for many types of service proximity on the ground is 
essential, multinational firms have tended to supply their foreign markets 
largely through these affiliates. In 2014, net sales of services on the part of 
these subsidiaries were close to $600 billion, more than twice the amount of 
net exports of services from the United States itself. 
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Pressure concentrated on the manufacturing wage bill 
The penetration of the American market accelerated sharply from the early 
1990s on, first through the conclusion of a free-trade treaty with Mexico and 
Canada and then, some years later, through China’s membership in the 
World Trade Organisation, which gave permanency to its access to the US 
market. The United States, whose imports had previously come from 
countries with fairly similar levels of development, opened up to countries 
whose levels of development – and hence of wage rates – were much lower 
than its own: this can be clearly seen from the widening of the gap between 
United States GDP per inhabitant and the average of its supplier countries 
(Graph 16). 
Graph 16. Origin of US imports and level of development of supplier countries, 
1973-2016 
 
Sources: Federal Reserve, International Monetary Fund, Maddison Project and authors’ 
calculation. 
This opening up to a new type of competitive rivalry, i.e. that of 
emerging countries, had a dual effect: in the first place, it led to increased 
penetration by imported goods on the American market. At the end of the 
2000s, imported apparel and footwear, for example, accounted for almost 
70% of American consumers’ purchases (McCully, 2011). This further 
intensified the erosion of the domestic manufacturing sector. Secondly, this 
new competition exerted downward pressure on the prices of goods 
produced in the United States: domestic producers, unable to improve the 
quality of their output sufficiently rapidly, were able to resist competition 
from producers in emerging regions only by cutting costs. The evolution of 
profits earned by firms in the two sectors – wholesale trade and 
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manufacturing – that played a central role in this increased penetration by 
manufactured products from the rest of the world clearly illustrates the 
interplay of forces acting during these years on the distribution of domestic 
income.  
For the most part, these forces weighed heavily on one particular 
component of American value added, namely labour income. Domestic 
firms, or at least some of them, in fact took advantage of this opening up to 
low-wage countries to relocate in one way or another their production 
activities. Although the sector is relatively small in size, the evolution of 
profits accruing to the wholesale sector is in this case revealing. Firms in this 
sector in fact acted as bridgeheads for the increasing flows of imported 
goods. Remember that this is the part of their classification where national 
accountants locate not only firms of a purely commercial character but also 
others which, such as Apple, for example, have their products made abroad 
before importing them to the United States. From the early 2000s on, even 
though the share of their total wage bill in GDP was falling at the time, that 
of their profits was rising by almost one percentage point (from 1.3% of GDP 
in 2001 to more than 2% in 2015).  
For the most part, however, it was in the manufacturing sector that the 
shift in the distribution of income was most massive, with the share of wages 
in the sector’s value added falling by more than 17 points. The result in the case 
of industrial firms which had themselves also become major importers of 
goods was spectacular, with the industries most concerned by the 
penetration of imports being also those where the share of wages in value 
added fell the most (Elsby et al., 2013). This had one major consequence: 
whereas the share of GDP generated in the manufacturing sector fell 
substantially, the profits generated in the sector remained unchanged as a 
share of GDP. The interaction of productivity gains, domestic job losses and 
outsourcing, combined with pressure on workers’ wage levels, meant that 
total wages in the sector bore the full brunt of the decline in the importance 
of manufacturing GDP: in just 20 years, between 1987 and 2007, the 
corresponding wage bill’s share of GDP fell by no less than six percentage 
points.  
The fact that the decline in the share of total wages in GDP fell by only 
2 points over the same period is mainly due, as will be seen in the following 
chapter, to the rise in employment in a small number of service sectors. 
Despite the considerable evolution in the respective importance of value 
added in different sectors, the share of GDP taken by corporate profits in fact 
remained relatively stable. For the most part, the shift between relative value 
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added in the various sectors, in response to the reshaping of domestic 
spending and to the evolution in international trade, took place through 
shifts in total wages (Graph 17). Sectors whose share of GDP rose most – such 
as healthcare and services to firms – also saw a rise in the share of wages in 
their own value added. The consequences for American employment and 
household incomes of this new distribution of the total wage bill were 
massive. 
Graph 17. Evolution in the relative size of sectors and of the shares of their total 
wages and profits in GDP, 1987-2015 (% of GDP) 
 
Note: The diameters of the circles are proportional to each sector’s share of GDP in 2000. 
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations. 
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3. EMPLOYMENT TENDENCIES AND WIDENING 
INEQUALITIES 
he sectoral tendencies outlined above explain in large measure the 
stagnation over several decades of real remuneration for many of the 
jobs available in the American economy. However, these factors did 
not prevent real wages from rising by 50% on average since the beginning of 
the 1980s. If one is looking for an explanation for why half of full-time workers’ 
wage incomes have since that date shown practically no further rise, one must take 
into account the changes taking place in the sectoral composition of activity 
as well as the differing rates of technical progress experienced in the various 
sectors. These changes and this progress have not only shifted the 
distribution of the wage bill in favour of the service sectors, they have also 
led to a modification in the nature of the jobs available. The shrinking of the 
manufacturing sector has been accompanied by a sharp reduction in the 
share of middle-income and medium-skilled jobs while at the same time the 
jobs generated by the expansion of service activities have tended to be either 
relatively low-paid and low-skilled or, on the contrary, be situated at the 
higher end of the scale, even though, as will be seen, these differences are 
not as clear-cut as is often thought. These tendencies have tended to widen 
wage inequalities, with the weak bargaining power of the less skilled 
workers – or workers not possessing the desired skills – curbing growth at 
the lower end of the wage scale. The consequences of these inequalities for 
household incomes have furthermore been intensified by the even greater 
inequalities in non-wage incomes.  
3.1 The polarisation of job creation 
Examination of the sectoral structure of employment since the end of World 
War II gives a first notion of the scale of the changes that have taken place. 
The data used here are admittedly less than perfect, taking into account as 
they do both part-time and full-time jobs and being adjusted to deal with the 
many changes in the activity nomenclature. They nevertheless show how the 
modification in the structure of production has been reflected in the structure 
T 
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of employment. Since the beginning of the 1950s, the proportion of 
employment accounted for by the goods-producing sectors has fallen from 
40% to less than 15% in 2016 (Graph 18). Among these sectors, construction 
is the only one whose share has remained stable (5%); the already small 
shares of agriculture and extractive industries declined even further; as for 
manufacturing industry, its share of employment has fallen from almost 30% 
to as little as 8%. This evolution is obviously directly related to the decline in 
the goods-producing sectors’ share of GDP, that of manufacturing in 
particular. However, it is also explained by productivity gains in these 
sectors that were greater than those seen in the rest of the economy. The 
increasing automation of production lines has made possible a spectacular 
reduction in employment at a time when the spectrum of industrial activities 
was also changing: activities related to repairs and maintenance, 
organisation, design and research, in particular, gradually took over from 
those directly concerned with production.2 
Growth in employment due to the services sector alone 
As a consequence of automation and relocation, jobs in manufacturing have 
in total shown no growth between 1970 and 2000, while their erosion since then 
has been spectacular. With employment in the public sector accounting for 
less than one-fifth of all jobs, as it did immediately after the war, the 
American economy has for several decades owed the relative dynamism of 
its job creation to the private tertiary sector, whose share has risen from less 
than one-half to almost 70% of the total (Graph 18). However, not all these 
activities have contributed to the rise in the same manner. Since the 
beginning of the 1970s, the share of the trade, transport and information 
sectors has remained relatively stable at close to 20%, while that of finance, 
after rising until the mid-1980s, has stabilised at around 5% and that of 
“other services” fallen slightly, by contrast. The small share taken by 
education services, which rose from 1% to 2%, requires comment. These 
                                                   
2 While job losses in manufacturing have been spectacular, the impact of 
robotisation, taken on its own, seems – so far, at least – to have been relatively 
modest: between 1990 and 2007, it is thought to have eliminated around 500,000 jobs 
(Acemoglu & Restrepo, 2017). The manufacturing sector is where most robots are to 
be found: almost 40% are used in the automobile industry, 20% in electronics and 
10% in both metalworking and chemicals. Less advanced in the United States than 
in Europe, robotisation could nevertheless expand in the coming years without 
necessarily having dramatic effects: Acemoglu & Restrepo expect that it will reduce 
the number of available jobs by 1-2% between 2015 and 2025. 
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figures refer only to posts in the private sector, whereas most of the posts in 
education are found in the public sector, where their share appreciably 
increased up to the beginning of the 1970s.  
Graph 18. Shares of employment, 1948-2016 (%) 
 
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations. 
Finally, just three groups of private service activities saw their share of 
employment rise sharply: that of healthcare rose from less than 2% to over 
12%, with that of professional and business services rising in equally 
spectacular fashion, while that of leisure activities and accommodation and 
food services, which was the largest immediately after the war, rose slightly 
more modestly (merely doubling) to reach 10% in the mid-2010s. As in the 
case of the manufacturing sector, these contrasting evolutions are the 
reflection of the reshaping of domestic expenditure but also of widely 
differing productivity gains. With the diffusion of IT technologies, these 
gains were substantial in trade, finance and the information sectors but 
virtually non-existent in other service sectors. Since the war, measured in 
volume, value added per post in the “wholesale trade, transport and 
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information” group grew at practically the same rate as in industry, but it 
stagnated in education and even fell in the health sector (which also includes 
social assistance). These evolutions naturally have to be interpreted with 
caution: calculating value added in “volume” is always a delicate matter, 
notably for certain service activities, healthcare in particular.  
Job creation in low-remuneration sectors but for high-remuneration 
activities  
A different set of data, available only since the beginning of the 1980s, 
contained in the Current Population Survey (in this case posts in private and 
public education are grouped together3) shows how these evolutions are 
reflected in remuneration. If sectors are classified according to their 2016 
median wage (full-time equivalent) the conclusion is unequivocal. There 
were numerous job losses in the manufacturing industry, where the median 
wage is close to that in the economy as a whole, whereas on the other hand 
jobs were being created in those service sectors where remunerations are 
situated at the two extremes of the wage scale: in accommodation and food 
services, retail trade, business support services and healthcare, activities 
with relatively low remuneration, but also in sectors with median wages 
slightly above that of the economy (education) or substantially higher, such 
as public administration, finance or professional services (Graph 19). All in 
all, more than half of the 50 million net job creations between 1983 and 2016 
were to be found in sectors with relatively low remuneration, while 
relatively few jobs were created, on a net basis, in sectors with wages close 
to the median for the economy, and barely one-third were to be found in 
sectors with high remuneration. A substantial proportion of low 
remuneration job creation took place in the healthcare sector, however, 
where the median remuneration is gradually approaching that of the 
economy as a whole, the discrepancy being 12% in 1991 but only 6% in 2016. 
                                                   
3 The CPS uses the NAICS: given that the public sector is confined to public 
administration in the narrow sense, teachers’ jobs are classified in the “education” 
sector. 
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Graph 19. Job creation by sector and wage level, 1983-2016 
(change in employment, millions)  
 
Note: Figures and black bars represent median usual weekly earnings of full-time workers for 
the sector as a ratio to the median of the economy in 2016.  
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Population Survey) and authors’ calculations. 
Examination of the evolution of employment, using the same set of 
data over the same period, but this time not by sector but by activity, sheds 
a somewhat different light on the changes that have taken place. Once again, 
the activities have been classified as a function of their 2016 median wage. 
Taking first the activities for which the remuneration is well below the 
median for the economy, it can be seen that the scale of net job creation in 
relatively unskilled service activities (guards, waiters, warehousemen, and 
so on) with very low remuneration is manifest. The absence of any increase, 
over a period of more than three decades, in the numbers of production-line 
and office workers, stands out equally clearly, with the steady erosion in the 
share of these jobs, carrying remuneration much closer to the median, 
reflecting the combined effects of import penetration and technical progress. 
However, the most spectacular evolution is to be found at the other end of 
the remuneration scale. During these same years, three-fifths of net job 
creations took place in the highest-paid activities, i.e. managers and 
specialists: in 2016 the median weekly wage in these two categories was 
between 40% and 50% above the median wage for the economy as a whole 
(Graph 20). 
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Graph 20. Job creation by occupations and wage level, 1983 and 2016 
(change in employment, millions)  
 
Note: Figures and black bars represent median usual weekly earnings of full-time workers for 
the sector as a ratio to the median of the economy in 2016.  
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Current Population Survey) and authors’ calculations. 
The laborious emergence of a ‘new middle’ 
More complete data from the Occupational Employment Statistics (available 
over a shorter period but making it possible to cross-tabulate roughly 800 
activities and numerous sectors) permit reconciliation of the preceding 
apparently contradictory observations. They show that a substantial 
proportion of the job creation in low-wage sectors in fact involved high-wage 
activities.  
The health sector provides a good illustration, containing as it does a 
wide variety of activities: in 2015, the median annual wage for jobs in the 
sector (full-time or part-time) ranged from $22,000 for unskilled home 
helpers (i.e. distinctly less than the $36,200 median wage for the economy as 
a whole) to almost $190,000 for doctors or surgeons. Over the past ten years, 
the health sector has created jobs throughout the wage scale, but, here again, 
with a tendency towards concentration at the two ends of the scale. The 
combined analysis by sector and activity confirms this polarisation: between 
2005 and 2015, 5 million posts were created at the top of the wage scale and 
almost 4 million at the bottom, whereas in the middle there were more than 
1 million job destructions (Graph 21). This nevertheless highlights a new 
phenomenon, namely, the coexistence of what Harry Holzer (2015) has 
called the “two middles”.  
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Graph 21. Variations in employment by wage level and by sector, 2005-15 
(millions)  
 
Notes: The classification for the public sector differs between the CPS and the OES. In addition, 
the OES collects its data from firms whereas the CPS collects its data from households. The 
respective coverages are therefore not identical (for example, independent workers and non-
remunerated family workers are included in the CPS but not in the OES). Conversely, workers 
performing several jobs are counted only once in the CPS but multiple times in the OES.  
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics (Occupational Employment Statistics) and authors’ 
calculations. 
For a long time, the middle of the remuneration scale consisted of 
production-line and clerical jobs requiring a low level of education and for 
which skills were often obtained ‘on the job’ and, as has just been shown, it 
is precisely these posts that have been eliminated by globalisation on the one 
hand and automation and computerisation on the other. However, in the 
middle of the scale new activities are emerging: this ‘new middle’ comprises, 
for example, repairs and maintenance technicians but also a number of 
healthcare activities (medical assistants, medical imaging technicians, for 
example) as well as the most dynamic elements of the business services 
sector or jobs in hotels and restaurants. The skills required for these new 
middle posts are difficult to obtain simply through experience. Failing 
adequate vocational training facilities for the transmission of skills to those 
liable to occupy these posts in the future, there is every likelihood that the 
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polarisation will persist. With the disappearance of jobs in the ‘old middle’, 
part of the under-trained manpower will have no choice but to move 
towards jobs at the bottom of the wage scale, thus helping to curb wage 
growth at this end.  
Box 4. Increased importance of alternatives to conventional wage-earning jobs 
In the United States, as elsewhere, employment is taking on an increasing 
diversity of forms: consultancy, subcontracting, interim work, ‘on demand’ 
work, even ‘payment by the job’, among others. Some are remunerated by 
wages, others are performed by independent workers. Some are well paid, 
some distinctly less so. The latter is particularly true in the case for jobs created 
by the platform economy, also called the gig economy (the term “gig” had 
previously described the participation of a musician at a concert in return for 
a fee). 
More and more firms are therefore offering, for a commission, to put 
individuals in touch with one another for the purpose of establishing business 
relationships. Along the same lines as Uber, which brings drivers and 
passengers directly into contact, TaskRabbit is an example of a peer-to-peer 
employment marketplace enabling each new ‘provider’ to choose the category 
of task that he is prepared to carry out (furniture assembly, housework, etc.). 
Other sites propose the performance of repetitive tasks for a small fee – the 
observed average hourly payment is less than $2 – along the lines of the 
microwork launched by Amazon at the end of 2005 (Amazon Mechanical 
Turk). Presented as introducing a new form of flexibility into the labour 
market, these jobs are often synonymous with hyper-flexibility as well as low 
pay.  
How important are these new forms of employment and, among them, 
how many are ‘petty jobs’ and how many are very well paid (consultancies, 
for example)? The Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) has in the past carried out 
several surveys concerning these “contingent and alternative employment 
arrangements”. The only workers whose jobs are recorded in this enquiry are 
those whose principal employment relates to these non-conventional regimes. 
The latest available enquiry dates back to 2005*: at that time there were 10.3 
million independent contractors, 2.5 on-call workers, 1.2 million temporary 
help agency workers and 0.8 million workers made available by contract 
firms. In total, these alternative forms of work accounted at the time for 
roughly 10% of total employment. While these new forms did not expand 
much between the mid-1990s and 2005 – rising from 9.3% of employment in 
1995 to 10.1% in 2005 – there is every reason to believe that their share of 
employment has risen considerably since then. According to Katz & Krueger 
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(2016), they are estimated to have accounted for almost 16% of employment 
in 2015. The authors note that between 2005 and 2015, the totality of the 
observed growth in employment – some 7 million posts – was in these 
alternative forms, with standard contracts showing no net increase over the 
period. 
However, this growth is by no means explained mainly by that of ‘petty 
jobs’ performed by the youngest workers. The authors estimate that only 0.5% 
of the labour force had its principal activity in the gig economy. In particular, 
they show that workers aged between 55 and 75 and having a high level of 
education are more likely than others to occupy an alternative job and that 
their share of employment rose more rapidly between 2005 and 2015 than that 
of younger and less educated workers. By inciting those who have lost their 
jobs – older workers in particular – to look for an alternative to traditional 
wage-earning employment, the depth of the 2007 recession is naturally a 
possible explanation of this phenomenon, at least to some extent. A later study 
nevertheless shows that the influence of the economic situation was marginal 
at best: “The increase in alternative work arrangements is much more the 
reflection of secular factors associated with rising inequality and technological 
changes leading to a breakup of the working place and a ‘segregation’ of the 
workers with the weakest bargaining power” (Katz & Krueger, 2017). 
__________________________ 
*The results of the BLS survey conducted in May 2017 will be published in 2018. 
 
3.2 Factors underlying an increased divergence of wage levels 
The stagnation – even decline – in real remuneration for a substantial portion 
of jobs began as far back as the early 1980s. The evolution between 1960 and 
2016 in the median wage for full-time workers provides an initial indication: 
over some 50 years, its rise, adjusted for inflation, was only 50%, i.e. less than 
1% per annum on average, with much of this (three-fifths) taking place 
before 1973, which marks the end of the period that Levy & Temin (2007) 
have named the “Golden Age”. The slow progress seen thereafter is 
explained by a reduction in the wage gap between men and women: since the 
beginning of the 1970s, the median real wage of full-time jobs performed by men has 
shown no progress (Graph 22). The change in the composition of jobs has 
reinforced the impact of the traditional factors underlying the differentiation 
of remuneration: in recent decades, with the notable exception of the male-
female wage gap, most of these factors – age, experience, level of education, 
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and so on – have tended to accentuate the differences, often by weighing 
down the lowest remunerations. 
Graph 22. Various measures of the median real wage, 1960-2016 
(workers over 15, thousands of 2016 dollars)  
 
* Persons who had a full-time (or part-time) job throughout the year, i.e. between 50 and 52 
weeks. This means, for example, that workers who experienced more than two weeks’ 
unemployment during the year are excluded.  
** Persons who had a full-time (or part-time) job for only part of the year. 
Source: US Census Bureau. 
Technical progress and the ‘education ‘premium’ 
Age and especially level of education seem to have become the determining 
factors. The remuneration gap between younger workers and their elders 
accordingly widened substantially during the 1970s and 1980s, above all 
through a decline in the median wage of younger workers: the remuneration 
gap between men aged 45-54 and those aged 25-34, after being close to 10% 
until the end of the 1960s, is now 40% (Graph 23). The effect of the ‘education 
premium’ has been even greater, with the widening of wage differences 
between higher-education graduates and high school graduates explaining 
almost two-thirds of the widening in income differences seen between 1980 
and 2005 (Goldin & Katz, 2007). In 1987, males with a bachelor’s degree had 
annual earnings that were on average $18,000 (2016 dollars) more than those 
of high school graduates; in 2016 their counterpart earned $30,000 more, a 
rise of more than 60% over the period (the rise was identical in the case of 
women). This ‘premium’, already significant, increased still further as a 
function of the diploma earned, with men obtaining a master’s degree or a 
doctorate earning $45,000 and almost $80,000, respectively, more than those 
with a bachelor’s degree. While the size of this education premium has 
ceased to climb since the beginning of the 2000s, its level still remains the 
highest among developed countries (Hanushek et al., 2013).  
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Median earnings
Mean earnings
Mean and median earnings
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Median
Full time over 1 year*
Median earnings
Full time**
Part time over 1 year*
Part time** 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
1974 1984 1994 2004 2014 1974 1984 1994 2004 2014 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Males
Total
Full-time workers’
median earnings*
Females
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: A EUROPEAN VIEW  49 
Graph 23. Inter-group wage inequalities (billions of 2016 dollars, median wages) 
 
Sources: US Bureau of Labor Statistics and US Census Bureau. 
The spectacular rise in the education premium during the 1980s and 
1990s is explained, in part at least, by a slowdown in the growth in the 
number of higher education graduates at a time when the demand for skilled 
manpower was rising strongly (Autor, 2014). Computerisation and 
automation have shifted the demand for labour in favour of tasks that are 
more complex, more productive and better paid: the new technologies have 
further improved the productivity of workers with the highest 
qualifications, contributing to a rise in their remuneration by comparison 
with those without any qualifications. The intermediate, more routine 
activities were tending at the same time to disappear, creating a tendency for 
jobs to become polarised, with highly skilled jobs at one extreme and, at the 
other, service jobs, admittedly of a routine nature but still difficult to replace 
by machines (a situation Autor named the “Polanyi paradox”, after the 
Hungarian epistemologist who observed that certain repetitive tasks were 
not easy to carry out using machines but could be easily executed even by 
unskilled workers). 
‘Firm premiums’ 
These inequalities, between younger and older workers, with or without 
diplomas, are not the only ones to have widened. Within each of these 
groups, the already substantial gaps have widened further still, with 
workers having the most advanced degrees particularly affected. Between 
2000 and 2016, the ratio between the average wage of the top decile and that 
of the bottom decile rose from four to almost five for male with post-
graduate degree (Graph 24). Over this period, those in the bottom decile saw 
their remunerations fall by more than 5% in real terms, compared with a rise 
of almost 20% for the top decile. Compounding the traditional differentiating 
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factors, others have been identified by recent studies, including some 
stemming from inter-company differentials. These are thought to explain a 
significant proportion of the widening of wage inequalities seen since the 
end of the 1970s (Song et al., 2016). In the case of small and medium-sized 
enterprises, the differences reflect a phenomenon of ‘sorting and 
segregation’ of jobs which the outsourcing referred to in the previous chapter 
has intensified. This phenomenon leads to a concentration in certain firms of 
high-value-added activities and of employees who are better trained, more 
experienced, and hence better paid. At the same time, in other firms with low 
value-added, workers are less well-educated, less experienced and not only 
receive lower wages but are often deprived of social benefits and of career 
prospects.  
Graph 24. Inter-group wage inequalities by degree level, 2000-16 
(men over 25, working full-time) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
For the very largest firms (those employing more than 10,000 workers) 
inequalities within the corporate structure also play a major role. In these 
firms, salaries towards the top of the scale rose by almost 140% between the 
beginning of the 1980s and the 2010s, mainly driven by the salaries – and the 
exercise of stock options – received by the top centile, or even by the highest-
remunerated 0.25%. At the same time, wages at the bottom of the scale 
declined in real terms: far from increasing by 30% over the period, as in the 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, the median wage declined by 7%. This 
fall is explained by the reduction in the ‘scale premium’ received by the least-
skilled workers in large firms, whose remuneration has been increasingly 
converging with that of workers in SMEs. A recent survey covering six main 
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sectors (manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, finance, transport and 
utilities and “other services”) sheds additional light on the factors tending to 
compress this scale premium: Autor et al. (2017) report an increasingly 
marked concentration of activity (‘winner takes most’) in superstar firms like 
Facebook or Google, where the relative size of the wage bill is low and 
tending to decline still further.  
Confronting market forces that tend to generate increased divergences 
in the evolution of remunerations, the erosion of the institutional 
arrangements intended to protect workers with the weakest bargaining 
power has permitted, as will now be shown, a sagging at the bottom of the 
wage scale.  
Weakened trade unions 
The decline in the rate of unionisation began as early as the end of the 1950s, 
but accelerated sharply during the 1970s, with the rate falling to barely more 
than 10% in the mid-2010s (Graph 25). This tendency helped to weaken the 
position of workers at the lower end of the scale, where the trade union 
presence seems to procure a more substantial ‘gain’. At the beginning of the 
2010s, according to certain studies, this gain was more than 15% for a high 
school graduate compared with less than 5% for someone with a college 
degree. The decline in the rate of unionisation is estimated to explain one-
fifth of the increase in the gap between the former and the latter (Mishel, 
2012). These conclusions naturally have to be interpreted with caution, as 
structural effects can come into play. For example, given that men are more 
frequently in managerial positions and that salaries at this level are little 
affected by the presence of trade unions, one might be led to think – wrongly 
– that, on average, a trade union presence is of more benefit to women!  
The role played by unionisation is all the more important in that many 
social benefits (health insurance, paid holidays) are decided through 
negotiation with the employer. This means that the weakening of the trade 
union presence has effects well beyond wage levels alone. Data taken from 
the ECEC (Employer Cost for Employee Compensation) show that not only 
are wages of trade union members higher than those of non-members ($27.50 
an hour compared to $21.80 in 2016), their social benefits are also 
substantially greater ($18 compared to $8.90). Above all, unlike the situation 
concerning the wage gap, the difference in social benefits has increased since 
the beginning of the 2000s. 
Because the procedure for the establishment of trade unions is often 
long-drawn-out and difficult to accomplish (requiring the positive vote of a 
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majority of workers) and sometimes even impossible (trade unions are 
banned in several states), alternative forms of association have emerged, 
such as worker centres. Originally set up to assist the least well-paid 
immigrant workers in the hotel and restaurant or construction sectors, their 
number has risen from a handful at the beginning of the 1990s to almost 250 
in 2015. Many of them in fact maintain close links with trade unions. For 
example, the Organization United for Respect at Walmart (OUR Walmart) is 
backed by the United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) while the 
Laundry Workers Center United is backed by Workers United, itself 
affiliated with the SEIU (Service Employee International Union); Fight for 15 
was set up by 200 fast-food workers in New York, who went on strike to 
obtain a wage of $15 an hour, and is also close to the SEIU. By supporting 
these movements, trade unions hoped to see an increase in membership. The 
SEIU is thought to have spent more than $19 million between 2012 and 2016 
on the Fight for 15 campaign. Despite this, the rate of unionisation in hotels 
and restaurants has remained very low (1.7% in 2016) and the number of 
SEIU members, after doubling between 2000 and 2012, has since stagnated 
at around 2 million.  
Erosion of the minimum wage 
In addition to the reduced trade union presence, another factor contributing 
to the decline at the bottom of the wage scale has been the absence of a 
regular adjustment for inflation in the minimum wage. This minimum wage 
had been instituted to set a floor, in nominal terms at least, under the lowest 
wages, regardless of the situation prevailing on the labour market. For such a floor 
to be effective, however, there has to be regular revaluation in order to take 
account of the rise in the general level of prices. Failing this, there is the 
possibility of a decline in real wages at the bottom end of the distribution. 
In the United States, the federal minimum wage – $7.25 an hour in 2015 
– applies in all the states. However, there are numerous derogations: 
farmworkers, seasonal workers, or workers aged less than 20 years can be 
paid below the minimum. The same is true of workers receiving regular 
gratuities, in which case the wage can be less than the minimum, on 
condition that the worker receives at least the equivalent amount. In 2015, 
870,000 workers were paid the federal minimum wage and roughly 1.7 
million were paid less than this amount. Taken together, these 2.6 million 
workers represented 3.3% of the hourly-paid and only 2% of the total wage-
earning employment. The erosion of the purchasing power of the federal 
minimum, which was particularly marked between the end of the 1970s and 
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the end of the 1980s (Graph 25), nevertheless had important consequences 
throughout the lower part of the wage scale. The fall in real terms of the 
minimum wage has helped to widen the gap between the workers at the 
bottom of the scale and those in the middle, this being particularly true for 
women. One (not very recent) study even concluded that, during the 1980s, 
the totality of the increase in the gap between the median wage and that of 
the 10% at the bottom of the scale had been due to the erosion of the federal 
minimum (Lee, 1999). The more recent study by Autor et al. (2016) finds, for 
the same period, a more modest, but significant, effect: the absence of regular 
revaluation of the minimum wage is thought to explain 30% to 40% of the 
widening of the gap. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, the 
contribution of the minimum wage to the intensification of inequalities 
seems to have been more modest. 
Graph 25. Unionisation rate, inequalities and the minimum wage, 1917-2016 
 
Sources: US Department of Labor; US Bureau of Labor Statistics; and Piketty et al. (2016). 
3.3 Ever-increasing – and more enduring – inequalities 
At the same time as market forces, which had been increasingly left to 
themselves, were curbing improvement in the lower half of the income scale, 
other factors, by contrast, were leading to a spectacular rise in remuneration 
for a minority of workers. The composition by profession of the 1% at the top 
of the scale is illuminating from this point of view: in the first place, in this 
percentile are to be found health professionals (doctors (14%) and dentists 
(2%)) but also lawyers (7%) and finance sector workers (6%) (Rothwell, 2016). 
Only 5% are to be found in the IT sector (software, system design, etc.). To a 
certain extent, of course, this observation supports the hypothesis of ‘biased 
technical progress’, according to which the new technologies mainly 
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improve the productivity of the most qualified workers, whose 
remunerations then increase by comparison with those of the unqualified. 
However, a ‘super star’ effect can be put forward as another possible 
explanation. At the beginning of the 1980s, Rosen (1981) pointed out that 
technical progress would encourage increasingly broad diffusion of certain 
products and services, providing situation rents for the makers or the 
providers, a good example being the market for recorded music: creation of 
specialised music channels, downloading of music files from internet, 
possibility of purchasing individual songs rather than complete albums. 
These novelties enabled musicians to reach a wider audience and to increase 
their sales and at the same time enhance their reputation and increase their 
concert revenue. This process is manifestly not confined to musicians and 
sports personalities (who account for only a small fraction of the top of the 
income scale), but applies also to doctors, lawyers and finance professionals 
who manage to achieve a ‘celebrity premium’. 
Inequalities heightened by the concentration of income from capital 
The inter-household distribution of income from capital has helped to 
increase still further the inequalities stemming from the labour market. At 
the beginning of the 2010s, according to Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
data, this income accounted for less than 4% of the income of households in 
the four lower quintiles but 13% of those in the upper quintile and as much 
as 30% in the case of the top centile. The Federal Reserve’s “Survey of 
Consumer Finances”, which has been available since 1989, shows that the 
distribution of the financial assets generating this income has become 
increasingly unequal: between 1989 and 2016, the average value of the 
financial assets of families in the two or even three lowest quintiles of income 
distribution has risen much less rapidly than that of households in the upper 
fourth and especially fifth quintiles (Table 1). The ratio between the financial 
assets of the top and bottom deciles accordingly rose from 30 to almost 90 in 
barely 25 years. In 2016, the average financial wealth of households in the 
lower quintile amounted to only $26,000, compared with $2.2 million for 
those in the top decile. The distribution of financial wealth is in fact even 
more unequal than these averages would suggest: the ratio between the 
median values of the financial assets of the top decile and the lowest quintile 
increased from 150 in 1989 to as much as 870 in 2016. Adjusted for inflation, 
the median value of assets held by the two lowest quintiles declined by 
almost 50% between 1987 and 2016 and that of the central quintile stagnated, 
whereas that of the two upper quintiles doubled or even trebled. Turning 
now to the distribution of net wealth – the value of financial and real estate 
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assets after deduction of debt – the share owned by the least well-off 90% of 
families has steadily been eroded, falling from 33% in 1989 to less than 23% 
in 2016. Over the same period the share of net wealth held by the richest 1%, 
for its part, rose from 30% to almost 40%. 
Table 1. Financial assets as a function of income distribution 
(thousands of 2016 dollars) 
 
Source: Survey of Consumer Finances. 
Inequalities only slightly diminished by mobility  
The observations made so far relate to the evolution in the distribution of 
remunerations and not the incomes received by a given wage-earner. By 
changing jobs or obtaining a raise, a worker can move along the wage scale 
and this mobility can reduce the inequality in the distribution of 
remuneration, seen this time not for a given year but for a longer period or 
even for the totality of working life. Regardless of the definition or of the 
particular time-horizon chosen, this mobility is far from being particularly 
great in the United States and, in particular, seems to have increased very 
little over time. 
In the short term, wage mobility is fairly limited. This is shown by data 
from the Social Security Administration concerning the wage income of 
individuals aged from 25 to 60. Kopczuk et al. (2010) report a strong 
correlation between the wage received by an individual in a given year and 
that received a year earlier. The results for a longer period (five years) are 
similar. Over a longer period still, mobility appears to be slightly higher but 
still quite low. The probability of moving out of the lower two quintiles to 
1989 2016
Change over 
1989-2016
1989 2016
Change over
1989-2016
1st quintile 22.4 26.1 16% 1.9 0.9 -50%
2nd quintile 44.1 46.6 6% 8.2 4.9 -40%
3rd quintile 59.6 93.3 56% 15.7 18.7 19%
4th quintile 98.5 183.7 86% 28.2 63.2 124%
9th decile 137.3 417.1 204% 55.2 178.6 223%
10th decile 702.3 2,230.9 218% 276.2 818.5 196%
10th decile /   
1st quintile
       
       
31.3 85.6 148.0 870.8
     
Mean value of holdings
     
     
Median value of holdings
     
56  EMPLOYMENT TENDENCIES AND WIDENING INEQUALITIES 
the next higher quintile in the space of 20 years is around 5%. While this 
probability has risen slightly since 1950, this is solely because of greater 
mobility for women: mobility for men has remained relatively stable over 
the period, with even a slight downward tendency in the past two decades. 
Using different data, Auten et al. (2013) show that long-term mobility, like 
shorter-term mobility, is lower for the two extreme quintiles than for the 
central quintiles: between 1987 and 2007 roughly half of the households in 
the lowest and highest quintiles remained in the same one, compared with 
just over a quarter in the case of the households in the three intermediate 
quintiles. On the other hand, mobility seems greater at the extremes of 
income distribution: only a quarter of the 1% with the highest incomes were 
in the same position 20 years later (although 70% remained in the top decile!). 
Not only has there been no tendency for mobility defined in this 
manner (movement during working life from one quintile to another) to 
increase, but income received over a complete career has tended to decline 
for successive generations, at least in the case of men: the median real income 
over a complete working life for men entering the labour market at the 
beginning of the 1980s, as stressed in Chapter I, was at least 10% lower than 
for those entering the labour market in 1967. More worrying still, this lifetime 
income has declined in the case of more than three-quarters of men, the 
difference being greater the lower the income. Only those positioned in the 
top 10% of the distribution saw their incomes increase over the period. 
During these same years, women, on the other hand, saw their lifetime 
income increase. However, here again, it is those situated towards the top of 
the scale who saw their incomes increase most. 
The determining role played by full employment in the evolution of the 
lowest incomes 
The polarisation of job creation, the stagnation of wages at the bottom of the 
scale and the rapid growth in earnings for the upper echelons, combined 
with the concentration of income from capital, have led to an increase in 
income inequality that has marked American society all the more because 
mobility has barely increased as decades have passed. Only the more rapid 
growth in women’s incomes and the increase in their wage mobility have 
produced any attenuation of this tendency, at least for certain households.  
Examination of the breakdown, by quintiles, of total ‘money income’ 
received by households (Census Bureau data) makes it possible to measure 
the scale of the evolution in inequalities. These incomes, measured before 
tax, comprise labour income (including retirement pensions), income from 
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capital (excluding capital gains) and monetary transfers received 
(unemployment benefits, for example) but exclude all benefits or advantages 
in kind (food stamps, health insurance, etc.). The widening of inequalities 
has gone on continuously since the end of the 1970s. The Gini coefficient 
provides an initial indication of this: its rapid increase during the 1980s and 
1990s reflects an ever-greater concentration of incomes. In 2015, the upper 
quintile received half the total income (as compared with slightly more than 
40% at the end of the 1960s) while the bottom quintile received barely 3% 
(Graph 26). With each passing decade, the share of monetary income received by 
the bottom three, or even four, quintiles has been steadily eroded.  
Graph 26. Measures of income dispersion, 1967-2016 
 
(*) Data adjusted to take account of differences in household size. For example, the 
equivalence-adjusted income would be the same for a single-person household with an 
income of $30,000 and a family household with two adults and two children and an income 
of nearly $65,000. 
Source: US Census Bureau. 
The consequences of widening inequalities are less worrying, 
however, if this is accompanied by growth in real incomes in general, in 
which case certain incomes simply grow more rapidly than others. But this 
was not the case in the United States in recent decades. With the exception 
of two particular periods during which incomes of the totality of households 
rose regardless of their position on the income scale – Lyndon Johnson’s 
Great Society and the greater part of the 1990s – the widening of inequalities 
has most often gone hand-in-hand with stagnation or even decline in the 
standard of living of many Americans. Since 1973, the real income of 
households in the bottom quintile has stagnated and that of the next two 
quintiles has hardly fared better. At the same time, the quintile containing 
the better-off Americans saw income growth of almost 60% (and almost 80% 
in the top 5%).  
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The result is even more impressive if one considers the Census Bureau 
data, adjusted to take into account household size. After this adjustment, the 
share of monetary income accruing to the bottom quintile in 2016 was 
slightly higher, but its evolution since 1967 turns out to have been even more 
dramatic, having almost halved! In fact, since the end of the 1960s the 
average income of families in the bottom quintile has often stayed close to 
the poverty threshold (Donavan et al., 2016): as a ratio of this threshold, it 
has fluctuated between 1.13 in 1974 and 0.88 in 1993, to stand at 1 in 2016. 
Graph 27. Household income by quintile*, 1971-2016 (2016 dollars, mean income) 
 
 
(*) In the right-hand graph, the estimated variable is the result of the following regression: 
dY.Q1t/t-4= – 0.9 (U t-U*t)expansion – 1.6 (U t-1-U*t-1) recession – 0.04dOil + 1 
where dY.Q1 is the average growth rate over four years of real income in the bottom quintile; 
U is the unemployment rate and U* is the NAIRU (non-accelerating inflation rate of 
unemployment); and dOil is the average growth rate over five years in the price of oil.  
If instead of incomes in the bottom quintile, one takes those in the second or third quintiles, 
one obtains very similar results, with one notable exception: the higher elasticity of income in 
phases of recession than in phases of expansion disappears. 
Source: US Census Bureau and authors’ calculations. 
One final feature of this evolution needs to be stressed. The continued 
widening of inequality since the beginning of the 2000s is not related to the 
growth in incomes for the top quintile but to the exceptionally marked 
erosion of lower incomes. For the first time since World War II, the Great 
Recession of 2007 was in fact accompanied by a substantial decline (by a 
cumulative total of 6% over four years) in the level of the highest incomes. 
However, the decline in the lowest incomes was more marked still. This 
draws attention to an essential characteristic of the American economy, 
namely that the evolution of household incomes, taking the entirety of the 
income scale, is highly cyclical. Even so, there is a notable difference between 
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the top and the bottom of this scale in that households at the top have rarely 
experienced a decline in their incomes. By contrast, for households in the 
lowest quintile, falls have been almost consistently the rule in cyclical 
troughs. The reason for this is simple: jobs for those at the bottom end of the 
wage scale are particularly sensitive to the situation on the labour market. 
Their remuneration rises only when this market is particularly tight, but will 
tend to fall once the unemployment rate picks up (Graph 27).The challenge 
which the US authorities have had to face since the beginning of the 1970s is 
therefore clear: given the quantity of labour, especially unskilled labour, 
‘liberated’ by technical progress and international trade, only by keeping the 
economy lastingly at full employment was it possible to prevent a collapse at the 
bottom end of the income distribution. This aim, attributed to fiscal policy as a 
priority immediately after the war, has in the past three decades been taken 
over by monetary policy. 
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4. FISCAL POLICY UNDER CONSTRAINT 
hile fiscal policy can help in maintaining full employment, it is by 
no means the primary role of the budget to regulate the business 
cycle. In the United States, as elsewhere, its primary purpose is to 
enable the state to perform activities of general interest financed by taxation. 
In the United States, these activities are to a great extent shared between the 
individual states and local authorities on the one hand and the federal 
government on the other. With the exception of defence, specifically 
sovereign functions are taken in hand at local level and it is at this same level 
that most expenditure on public investment, in the broad sense, is carried 
out: this includes the installation of the physical infrastructure needed for 
the functioning of economic and social life as well as expenditure on 
education at primary, secondary and, in large part, university level. The 
federal government, for its part, is responsible for virtually all defence 
spending and for a large part of the cost of the major social programmes 
introduced as part of the New Deal and later with the War on Poverty.  
Inasmuch as the benefits derived by individuals from these 
programmes and from other federal spending are not automatically linked 
to their contributions to their financing, the federal budget naturally 
becomes an instrument for redistribution among members of the population. 
By this means, some of the inequalities described in the previous chapter can 
be corrected. Similarly, the budgets of the individual states and local 
authorities make it possible, at their respective levels, to perform a further 
essential redistribution. Spending on infrastructure and education also 
makes a contribution – less direct, admittedly, but more lasting – to a 
reduction in inequalities and an increase in the lowest incomes. Thanks to 
this spending, residents of a particular state can receive a better education, a 
city can attract more dynamic enterprises, and so on. As a result, their 
residents will be able to obtain better remunerated jobs and to improve their 
positioning in the distribution of the national income. Moreover, given that, 
taken as a whole, residents in each state do not receive as much from the 
federal budget as they pay into it, the latter is also an instrument for the 
redistribution of the national income among the states. 
W 
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The budgets of developed economies can also play a role in the 
stabilisation of the economic situation and the maintenance of full 
employment. In the case of the United States, this role is performed almost 
entirely by the federal budget: by adjusting the evolutions of its revenue or 
expenditure, the federal government can support activity in the event of a 
weakening of private demand. In the immediate aftermath of the Second 
World War, Congress gave the federal government the task of using the 
budget balance to ensure the maintenance of full employment. However, its 
capacity to meet this function has been trimmed back in recent decades. The 
aversion to public intervention and the desire to reduce the public tax 
burden, especially the burden of federal taxation, have helped to curb the 
rise in tax revenue without checking the upward tendency in expenditure, 
especially on the major social programmes in place. The result has been a 
virtually permanent deficit in the federal budget despite the substantial 
reduction in the burden of defence expenditure. The desire to cut back the 
resulting increase in public debt has become a permanent constraint on fiscal 
policy and has tended to overshadow the aim of contributing to the 
maintenance of full employment.  
4.1 State and local authority budgets and the federal budget 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the bulk of United States public 
expenditure was carried out at the level of individual states and local 
authorities. The federal constitution in fact left each state responsible for 
defining and regulating local living conditions and economic life and for 
ensuring the investment needed for its development. For the most part, 
therefore, spending by local government – states, counties, cities, etc. – is 
devoted to sovereign functions (police, the court system, public 
administration and so on) but also to education and to spending on 
infrastructure (roads, urban infrastructure, public buildings, water supply 
systems, etc.). After rising steadily just after the Second World War, notably 
under the impact of the rise in spending on education linked to the ‘baby 
boom’, operating expenditure by the states and local authorities remained 
close to 10% of GDP and their physical investment also remained stable, at 
close to 2% of GDP. This stability was due in part to the relatively strict 
budgetary rules applied at local level. Most states are in fact prohibited, often 
by their constitutions, from borrowing in order to finance current 
expenditure. To finance investment, states or local authorities are however 
entitled to issue bonds carrying a special tax advantage in that interest 
payments are exempted from federal taxes if received by residents. 
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Furthermore, state governors are authorised to cut back committed 
expenditure, even in the course of the year if necessary, should budget 
revenue be lower than expected. However, in order to avoid having to take 
such drastic steps, states are permitted to build up reserves (‘rainy day 
funds’) enabling them to absorb a temporary decline in revenue: in normal 
times these reserves are sufficient to cover, on average, more than one 
month’s expenditure.  
The build-up of social programmes 
Wars and the Great Depression produced far-reaching modifications in the 
relative size of the budgets of states and local authorities and that of the 
federal government. The two world wars, especially the second, led to an 
explosion in military spending (which accounted for almost 40% of GDP 
during the first half of the 1940s). This expenditure, almost entirely out of the 
federal budget, remained close to 10% of GDP until the end of the 1960s 
before declining steadily to only around 4% in the mid-2010s. After 
accounting for practically three-quarters of the discretionary spending in the 
federal budget – the part subjected to a vote in Congress for each fiscal year 
– defence spending now represents only one-half, whereas the other 
discretionary spending – civil expenditure for the functioning of the federal 
government – has accounted for a relatively stable share of GDP for more 
than half a century, between 3% and 4%. Excluding transfers, total federal 
government spending – current expenditure, investment and interest 
payments – is now once again less than that of the states and local authorities.  
The reduction in defence spending and the stability of civil 
discretionary spending nevertheless failed to prevent the federal budget 
from posting a continuous expansion under the impact of the rise in the 
social transfers for which it is almost exclusively responsible. Retirement and 
invalidity pensions paid by Social Security have steadily increased since the 
Second World War, reaching 5% of GDP in the mid-2010s; the Medicare and 
Medicaid programmes expanded substantially, reaching more than 6% of 
GDP at the same date. The income-related insurance programmes 
(unemployment insurance, in particular), which are also paid out of the 
federal budget, impose, on the other hand, a burden which, while it 
fluctuates with the business cycle, has remained stable on average at close to 
1.5% of GDP. All in all, more than half the federal budget is now spent on 
transfers to households (Graph 28).  
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Graph 28. Public spending as a share of GDP, 1950-2016 (%) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
Income tax and social contributions, the principal resources of the 
federal government 
Turning now to the revenue side of this budget, the most striking tendency 
has been the rise in payroll taxes. Their rate (just over 15% in the mid-2010s) 
is applied to all salaried income up to a certain ceiling. These contributions, 
specifically intended to finance Medicare and retirement insurance, are 
placed in dedicated trust funds, and amounted to the equivalent of almost 
7% of GDP in 2016. In parallel with the rise in the amount of social 
contributions, there has been a distinct decline in the role of corporation tax, 
the burden of which fell from 4% of GDP at the end of the 1960s to 2% in the 
mid-2010s. Personal income tax, averaging close to 8% of GDP, remains 
(ignoring short-term cyclical fluctuations) the most important and most 
stable of the sources of federal revenue.  
The sources of income in the case of the states and local authorities are 
more diverse than for the federal government (Graph 29). Certain states also 
impose taxes on personal income, or even on company profits (although at 
rates much lower than in the case of the federal government). States also levy 
social contributions (particularly to fund the normal unemployment 
insurance regimes that are specific to each particular state), but they also levy 
sales taxes at rates set by themselves. In addition, the local authorities derive 
a substantial portion of their revenue from taxes on real estate ownership. 
All in all, since the beginning of the 1970s the tax receipts of states and local 
authorities have amounted to barely more than 8% of GDP, in other words, 
a much smaller amount than the tax revenue in the federal budget. However, 
these resources are supplemented by increasingly large federal transfers, 
partly to finance some of the expenditure by each state related to the 
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Medicaid programme (this portion, amounting to at least one-half, is greater 
the smaller the state’s income per head). In addition, the federal government 
covers the administrative costs of the normal unemployment insurance of 
each state, while the latter pays the cost of unemployment benefit (lasting a 
maximum of 26 weeks). A so-called ‘extended’ programme for 20 additional 
weeks can nevertheless be applied in states encountering special difficulties, 
in which case the cost is shared between the state and federal governments. 
Lastly, at times of severe recession, emergency programmes can be 
implemented, entirely financed by the federal budget. This was particularly 
the case between June 2008 and December 2013 at the time of the Great 
Recession.  
Graph 29. Public revenue as a share of GDP, 1950-2016 (%) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
4.2 Public budgets and the redistribution of national income 
The development of an economy and its adaptation to international trade 
and to technical mutations are often achieved through budget spending. This 
is particularly true when the rapid disappearance of traditional industries 
calls for public investment intended to facilitate the emergence of new 
activities. It may then be necessary to install new infrastructure to attract 
forward-looking enterprises or to set up new training institutions to permit 
the reskilling of those put out of work. Sometimes, income transfers may be 
the only means of indemnifying the ‘losers’ in the globalisation or 
automation processes. In the United States, however, the relationship 
between local and federal budgets, as well as the nature of the existing 
transfer mechanisms, considerably limit the role of central government in 
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adapting the economy and society in general to far-reaching and rapid 
mutations of the kind seen in recent decades. 
Redistribution among the federated states … 
This point can be illustrated by an initial observation, relating to the 
mechanisms for interstate redistribution via the federal budget. Differences 
in GDP per head among American states are in fact comparable to those 
existing within the eurozone. Excluding outliers, the ratios concerned range 
from one to two (only partially compensated by differences in price levels). 
Although obviously smaller than differences between individual 
households, these income differences are nevertheless substantial. If nothing 
occurs to correct them, the tax revenue of individual states, related to the 
number of inhabitants, will also differ by factors of one to two. It is important 
to note, therefore, that the capacity of each state to attract new activities and 
to improve the skill levels of its inhabitants depends directly on the 
budgetary resources at its disposal. And it is at the level of individual states 
and local authorities, as we have just seen, that the bulk of public investment, 
in the broad sense, is financed. For example, practically all education 
expenditure is financed by the local authorities, with the contribution from 
central government limited essentially (apart from the financing of certain 
types of R&D) to means-tested university grants and to guaranteeing the 
loans on which many students rely to finance their higher education. 
The contribution of the federal government to the financing of 
infrastructure is somewhat more substantial (NASBO, 2016). Even so, more 
than two-thirds of this financing relies on local resources, half of which come 
from bond issues. The American Society of Civil Engineers has for many 
years been drawing attention to a worrying ageing of infrastructure, taking 
the United States as a whole. At the beginning of the 2010s, it estimated the 
unfunded cost of the locally-financed investment needed for road transport, 
school buildings and water systems in the period 2013-20 at almost $2 
trillion. While the existence of such a deficit is common to practically all 
states, it is particularly onerous for poorer regions. While almost half of 
school buildings suffer from a lack of necessary repairs, this proportion 
increases in proportion to the poverty of children (McNichol, 2016). And yet 
it is often in these same regions that additional public investment could do 
most to facilitate the adjustment to the structural mutations that the United 
States is now facing. However, these far-reaching mutations are sufficiently 
slow as not to provoke the extreme measures on the part of central 
government that would help to cope with them. It took an exceptional crisis 
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– the Great Depression – to persuade the federal government to free 
individual states from the constraint imposed by their individual investment 
capacities. During these dark years, the creation of the Tennessee Valley 
Authority was one of the rare episodes in which substantial federal resources 
were placed at the service of the transformation of states that were among 
the poorest in the country.  
…essentially through differing contributions to the federal budget  
Recent decades have seen no such mobilisation. This can be shown by 
comparing the GDP per head of each state with the payments of all kinds its 
residents receive from the federal budget. Whether one takes these payments 
in the broad sense (for example, including federal expenditure related to the 
servicemen stationed in the state or the contracts concluded by the federal 
government with local enterprises) or limiting the definition to explicit 
transfers from federal government to resident households or institutions 
(retirement pensions paid by Social Security, federal subsidies paid to the 
state itself, to local authorities or to enterprises), the conclusion is the same: 
related to the number of a state’s inhabitants, the amount of transfers received 
is independent of its relative level of development (Malkin & Wilson, 2013). 
This does not mean that the federal budget does not redistribute a 
significant portion of national income among the federated states: in relation 
to the number of inhabitants, the contribution of each state to the federal 
budget is indeed higher the more economically developed the state. 
However, the redistribution among the states takes place almost entirely 
through the modulation of the taxes paid by their inhabitants to the federal 
government and very little by means of the transfers and payments they 
receive from it: because federal taxation is progressive, residents in states 
with the lowest incomes are also those for whom the average tax rate is 
lowest. It is as if residents in the richest states are prepared to accept that the 
federal government should take a larger proportion of their income even 
though the services they receive from the centre are the same as for the 
poorer states. While this redistribution is a reality, it is not of a kind that 
would facilitate greater investment on the part of states with the least 
resources. The fact that their residents pay less tax to the federal government does 
not in itself provide them with any additional finance.  
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Inter-household redistribution more through taxes than through 
transfers 
Turning now to observation, for the United States as a whole, of 
redistribution among households, either through the federal budget or those 
of states and local authorities, the conclusion remains the same: taking all 
these budgets together, this redistribution takes place much more through 
the taxes paid than through the transfers received. The first, most narrowly 
defined, measure uses the difference between the total taxes paid and the 
various transfers received, in cash or in kind, from a public institution. A 
second, broader, measure attributes to each individual a share of the benefits 
derived by each one, without distinction, as a result of the totality of the 
state’s activities, not only of a sovereign nature but also in the form of 
education, infrastructure investment, etc. Regardless of the approach 
adopted, the conclusions are the same: broadly speaking, the redistribution 
of United States national income among households via public budgets is 
much more a matter of the sums that each individual pays to the state than what he 
or she receives.  
Calculations by the Tax Foundation show this clearly by comparing, 
for 2012, what each family pays on average to the government (at federal and 
local level) with the amount it receives, according to its income before taxes 
and transfers. The benefit derived from the services provided by public 
authorities is in this calculation distributed uniformly among families 
(taking the view that the public deficit is not the source of a transfer from 
future generations4). One feature stands out: the transfers received and the 
services provided, in all their forms, are fairly similar per family (in the range 
of $30,000-$35,000) regardless of the quintile of income distribution 
concerned (Table 2). By contrast, the duties and taxes paid are no less than 
20 times higher for families in the top quintile than for those in the bottom. 
This observation requires a certain qualification, however: given that the size 
of families in the top quintile is only about half that of families in the bottom 
one, the transfers received per head show greater differentiation than the 
                                                   
4 The existence of a budget deficit means that public spending is not entirely covered 
by the state’s current revenue. Two approaches are then possible. One can either 
reduce all public spending proportionally and increase uniformly all levies and taxes 
paid by each individual by a total amount equal, in both cases to, half the deficit or 
make no changes in the results obtained, in which latter case the current generation 
benefits from a transfer from future generations and redistribution between 
households in the present generation is correspondingly reduced. 
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transfers per family. Even so, the table confirms the decisive role played by 
taxation, especially at federal level, in the redistribution of income in the 
United States. This preponderant role of federal taxation should come as no 
surprise. The resources of many states consist of non-progressive taxes (sales 
taxes in particular), whereas federal taxes are markedly progressive.  
Table 2. Distributional effects of government fiscal policies on average families, 
2012 (by income level, in dollars) 
 
Source: Prante & Hodge (2013). 
Major social programmes with fairly evenly distributed benefits 
Using these figures to derive conclusions regarding the intensity of 
redistribution in the United States is no easy matter. Granted, Table 2 shows 
post-redistribution differences that are much smaller than before 
distribution: whereas initially the average income of families in the top 
quintile was 30 times that of families in the bottom quintile, redistribution 
via the budget brings this ratio down to 6! However, part of this spectacular 
reduction is explained by the benefits received by all households in the form 
of services provided by the government. As these benefits are in this case 
assumed to be the same for all, the income of the poorest households rises, 
as the result of this redistribution, relatively more than that of the richest. 
The bulk of the services provided by states and local authorities are of this 
type. Leaving aside sovereign expenditure, it is at this local level, as we have 
seen, that a large part of public spending on education and infrastructure is 
carried out. While the federal government also takes in hand certain 
activities of general interest – notably defence – whose benefits are assumed 
All families Bottom 20% 2   quintile 3   quintile 4   quintile Top 20%
Average market income 81,602 9,561 31,053 56,884 100,242 311,405
Average taxes paid ( 1) 31,824 6,331 11,913 20,429 35,325 122,217
- Federal 21,293 2,966 6,854 12,848 23,668 86,975
- State & local 10,530 3,365 5,059 7,581 11,657 35,242
Average spending received ( 2) 31,824 33,402 30,052 30,144 31,122 35,141
- Federal 21,293 24,125 20,266 20,225 19,579 21,402
- State & local 10,530 9,278 9,786 9,920 11,542 13,739
Average redistribution = (2) - (1) 0 27,071 18,139 9,715 -4,203 -87,076
- Federal 0 21,158 13,412 7,377 -4,089 -65,573
- State & local 0 5,913 4,727 2,339 -115 -21,503
81,602 36,632 49,192 66,599 96,039 224,329
nd rd th
Average income after redistribution
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here to be uniformly distributed, it is above all the principal source of the 
transfers, in cash or in kind, received by households. These transfers form 
part of programmes which in many cases are of a redistributive nature. Even 
so, the most substantial of them lead to the receipt of sums whose 
distribution is relatively even over much of the income scale. 
This is the case, in particular, for the two principal programmes, 
Medicare and Social Security, whose benefits are reserved for elderly people, 
regardless of income. In order to benefit from Medicaid, it is necessary to be 
over 65 and to have paid the appropriate contributions for a period of at least 
five years. While these benefits are a function of each individual’s income 
over the whole of his/her working life, the benefits received in a given year 
will, in principle, not differ much across the income scale. Things are 
somewhat different for the public pillar of the retirement pension system. 
Admittedly, each individual contributes in this case a fixed portion of 
income (up to an annual ceiling of roughly $110,000 in the mid-2010s), but 
the retirement pension received will be a function of the past annual 
payments adjusted using coefficients that sharply increase the replacement 
rate for the lowest-paid and reduce it for the highest incomes5 (CBO, 2006). 
This progressivity (diminished, in reality, by the shorter life expectancy of 
the lower-paid) tends to compress differences in the amounts of individual 
pensions received from the federal government. The fact that the two major 
programmes both lead to transfers that tend to be distributed in relatively 
even fashion over a large part of the income scale obviously in no way 
diminishes their redistributive nature, if this is measured by the relative 
contribution to each individual’s income. For those with no other source of 
income, the pension paid out by Social Security clearly means more than it 
does for someone receiving a supplementary income from a pension fund. 
Social assistance reduced to basic needs 
The federal programmes providing assistance to the lowest-income 
households or those with no income at all are the expression of a form of 
social solidarity limited in practice to meeting basic needs. Two programmes 
of aid in kind, aimed at the most disadvantaged – Medicaid for healthcare 
and SNAP (Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program) for food stamps – 
are responsible for the bulk of this assistance. To these should be added the 
                                                   
5 The invalidity pensions paid by Social Security are the most redistributive, since 
they mainly benefit those who have received the lowest incomes whereas 
contributions are identical over much of the income distribution scale.  
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SSI (Supplemental Security Income), which provides monetary assistance to 
the least well-off citizens suffering from a disability, regardless of whether 
they have a job. The three taken together amount to almost two-thirds of 
federal spending on social assistance. 
Moreover, alongside the unemployment insurance arrangements that, 
as we have seen, cover relatively short periods of unemployment, except in 
the event of exceptionally severe crises, only the EITC (Earned Income Tax 
Credit) programme provides supplementary income for those with 
resources below a certain threshold, on the condition that they are working. 
The amount of this tax credit corresponds to a proportion of the income 
derived from work that initially increases and later decreases with the level 
of this income. This evolution is such that there is always a financial incentive 
for the recipient to work more (Box 5). In 2015, 26 million households earning 
less than $55,000 a year benefited from this programme, whose total 
budgetary cost (over $55 billion) was nevertheless only a very small 
proportion of GDP.  
Box 5. The Earned Income Tax Credit* 
The EITC is a tax credit granted by the federal government to low-income 
households (26 states and the District of Columbia add their own tax credit to 
that of the federal government). The amount of the tax credit depends on the 
beneficiary’s marital status, number of children and income. It increases from 
the first dollar of income up to a certain threshold and then declines, reaching 
zero when the income exceeds a given amount (Graph 30). When the amount 
of the tax credit exceeds that of the tax payable, the difference is paid to the 
household. In 2016, the average tax credit for a family with children was 
slightly more than $3,000 (but only $304 for a family without children).  
Graph 30. Tax credit in 2016 for a married couple submitting a joint declaration ($) 
 
Source: Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. 
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The EITC is a mechanism intended to encourage work as close to full-
time as possible on the part of wage-earners receiving the lowest 
remunerations. In 2015, it prevented 6.5 million people from having an 
income situated below the poverty threshold. A family with two children, 
including a single full-time worker, and receiving the minimum wage 
($12,500 a year) will not be above this threshold if it does not in fact benefit 
from the EITC and from food aid (SNAP)! 
__________________________ 
* For more information on this tax credit, see “The earned income tax credit”, Policy Basics, 
Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, October 2016. 
 
The small scale of the programmes intended to correct by means of 
monetary transfers the distribution of incomes that stems from the labour 
market is a fairly natural reflection of the aversion to public intervention 
discussed in Chapter 1. One of the reasons put forward by Alesina et al. 
(2001) to explain the difference of roughly 10% of GDP between social 
programmes in the United States and in Europe sums up the situation quite 
neatly: “in Europe a needy person is regarded as having had no luck, in the 
United States as being lazy”.  
All things considered, the federal redistribution between households 
has features that resemble the distribution between the federated states, 
significantly reducing the differences between the top and bottom of the 
income scale but more as the result of the progressivity of taxes paid at the 
top than by transfers paid to those at the bottom. Because of this, it is 
incapable of correcting the consequences for household income of an 
increased polarisation of the remuneration of employment, or even total 
disappearance of part of it. In particular, redistribution through the budget 
is not designed to indemnify those who have lost their jobs as a result of 
globalisation or automation and who are having difficulty in finding other 
employment. The fact that the recipients of the highest incomes are the 
predominant source of federal income does nothing to enable those who 
have finally accepted a less well-paid job – or have given up looking for one 
– to regain their previous standard of living – or the standard of living to 
which they felt they were entitled. 
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4.3 The budget as instrument for maintaining full employment 
With budgetary redistribution not sufficiently powerful to compensate for 
the polarisation of remuneration resulting from the operation of the labour 
market, only the maintenance of full employment is capable of avoiding a 
deterioration in the standard of living of those with jobs at the bottom of the 
scale – let alone, a fortiori, enabling it to improve. From this point of view, the 
United States has learned the lessons of the Great Depression and the 
accompanying social disaster: the ‘aversion to public intervention’ now goes 
hand-in-hand with priority for full employment. While the federal budget 
has often played an important role in this respect, United States fiscal policy 
has for many decades now only rarely been conducted with this objective in 
mind.  
From the Keynesianism of the 1960s ... 
By drafting the 1945 Full Employment Bill, the House of Representatives, 
with a Democratic majority, had nevertheless set out to make this objective 
explicit. Noting that it was only the war effort that had made it possible to 
bring unemployment down to its 1920s level, this text aimed to give every 
American the right to a job that was “useful, steady, correctly remunerated 
and full-time” (Santoni, 1986). To see to it that this right was effectively 
exercised, the Full Employment Bill went so far as to explicitly require the 
federal government to set each year’s spending at the level needed to ensure 
full employment. The Employment Act that was finally passed by Congress 
turned out to be slightly less ambitious, requiring the federal government to 
use its budget, not to maintain full employment at any price, but at least to 
ensure “a maximum level of employment, production and purchasing 
power”. A Council of Economic Advisers was set up to make suggestions to 
the President concerning the measures to be taken to reach this goal.  
In the years immediately following World War II, unemployment 
remained relatively low without much need for fiscal policy to intervene. 
Defence spending raised the federal budget to such a size that the operation 
of the automatic stabilisers was on its own almost sufficient to keep the 
economy at its potential. The steep progressivity of direct taxes (rates of up 
to 90% for household income tax and 52% for taxation of company profits) 
considerably cushioned the impact of an economic slowdown on the 
disposable income of both enterprises and households (in the latter case 
further aided by the unemployment benefits paid to those finding 
themselves temporarily out of work). It was not until the arrival of a 
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Democratic president in the early 1960s that, even in the absence of any 
threat of recession, a fiscal policy aimed expressly at pushing the economy 
to “maximum-employment level” was implemented. In response to a 
proposal by Walter Heller, whom President Kennedy had appointed to head 
the Council of Economic Advisers, the Tax Reform Act of February 1964 
sharply reduced the rates of direct taxation in order to stimulate overall 
demand, even though the federal budget was already in deficit. Lekachman 
(1969) has drawn particular attention to the importance of this move, which 
went against the “time-worn identifications between public and private 
finance and individual and governmental virtue”. After an initial much-
remarked success – with the unemployment rate falling to around 3% in 
1966, its lowest level since the war – this Keynesian experience soon came to 
a halt, when President Johnson and the Pentagon deliberately understated 
the increase in defence spending related to the Vietnam War, with no 
compensatory measures being proposed by the CEA. Inflation, which until 
then had been efficiently kept under control, began a rapid rise. Worse still, 
because of the first oil shock, the 1970s saw steady increases in both inflation 
and unemployment. This combination would turn out to be particularly 
corrosive for the remuneration of a large proportion of American jobs and it 
was during these years that the erosion of the purchasing power of the 
lowest wages began. 
… to the Reaganism of the 1980s 
The monetary turmoil seen at the end of the 1970s marked a turning point in 
the conduct of fiscal policy. Contrary to the continuing hopes of the 
promoters of the 1978 Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act – the 
Humphrey-Hawkins Act – the federal budget soon ceased to have full 
employment as a priority objective. With the arrival of Ronald Reagan, 
formerly Governor of California (the ‘tax revolt’ state), in the White House, 
stimulation of the supply-side via an easing of tax pressure took over from 
stimulation of demand. The tax cuts in the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act 
(ERTA), under which, for example, the maximum rate of household income 
tax was cut from 70 to 50%, were not aimed at keeping the economy at its 
potential but at raising this potential by means of incentives to business 
investment. As the expected additional growth, by raising the tax base, was 
assumed to prevent the decline in tax rates from harming budgetary 
equilibrium, this should not have produced an increase in public debt. 
However, the outcome was not entirely in conformity with the promises 
made by the supply-side theoreticians: in the space of two years, budget 
revenue as a share of GDP fell by three points and the public deficit rose by 
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the same amount to reach 5% of GDP. With defence spending 
simultaneously rising sharply, the growth upturn subsequently did little to 
reduce this deficit: between 1980 and 1987, federal debt as a proportion of 
GDP, after declining steadily since the war, rose from 25 to 40%. Although 
not its objective, this supply-side policy in the end stimulated demand and 
contributed to the return to full employment: in just a few years the 
unemployment rate, after standing at 11% at the beginning of the Reagan 
presidency, was halved. Another effect of this policy was to arouse serious 
concern on the part of some observers regarding the financial prospects for 
the federal government. Despite the raising of the retirement age decided in 
1983,6 the ageing of the baby-boomers would inevitably increase the cost of 
the major social programmes from the end of the 2010s on. Entering this 
period carrying an already substantial debt burden involved considerable 
danger.  
Stemming the rise in public debt rapidly became the main 
preoccupation of a section of Congress. As early as the mid-1980s the 
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Deficit Reduction Act introduced a system of 
automatic spending cuts aimed at balancing the federal budget within five 
years. This approach having failed, the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act 
abandoned any forced return to equilibrium but prohibited any lasting tax 
reform or new social programme unless the budgetary cost was entirely 
compensated by spending cuts elsewhere. This ‘pay-as-you-go’ principle 
continues even today, after several amendments, to restrict potential fiscal 
measures: the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has the task of 
systematically evaluating the consequences for future receipts and spending 
(as well as those of the proposed compensatory measures). Complemented 
by a system of caps on discretionary spending, these rules have helped to 
contain the federal government deficit. Even so, the return during the 1990s, 
first to equilibrium and then to surplus, in the federal budget was due in 
large part to the firm growth in economic activity – and in stock market 
prices, the source of taxable capital gains. At the beginning of 2000, federal 
debt had fallen to 30% of GDP (Graph 31), while simultaneously, for the first 
time since the 1960s, the unemployment rate had fallen back to 4%. The 
return of sufficient tightness on the labour market then permitted significant 
progress, in real terms, in the lowest wage incomes.  
                                                   
6 The decision taken was to raise it progressively to 67 by 2027.  
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Graph 31. Federal government budget balance, federal debt and unemployment 
rate, 1967-2016  
 
* Federal debt held by the public. 
Source: Congressional Budget Office. 
The federal budget, ‘stabiliser of last resort’ for activity 
On top of past policy disappointments, the desire to limit public spending 
and indebtedness – whether out of principle, on the part of those who believe 
that the government’s hold on the economy is excessive, or out of prudence, 
on the part of those who wish to face the financial challenges of ageing from 
a favourable position – has had the effect of preventing the federal budget 
from playing an active role in the regulation of overall demand. Since the 
beginning of the present century, however, the budget has on at least two 
occasions helped to stabilise activity in an economy faced with two dramatic 
shocks. The first of these occurred when a stock market bubble of a size 
comparable to that of 1929 burst. The tax reductions promised by George W. 
Bush in his election campaign (the 2001 Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act further reduced the rate of taxation of household 
incomes) and the defence spending related to the Iraq war warded off the 
risk of a deep recession – not that this was the objective. The return of strong 
growth, thanks to resolute monetary policy, permitted a sharp reduction in 
the deficit, the result being that federal debt rose in total by only four points 
to level off at slightly above 35% of GDP in 2004. The same could not be said 
following the outbreak of the financial crisis in 2008. Failing other options, 
the budgetary lever was then used on a massive scale and without hesitation. 
The fact was that it was no longer a question of fine-tuning economic activity 
but of avoiding its total collapse. At the cost of an impressive widening of 
the federal deficit – which in 2009 came close to 10% of GDP – it was possible 
to achieve this, with the decline in activity kept below 4%. The cost in terms 
of public borrowing was huge, however. The authorities wisely withdrew 
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this support only gradually as the spending behaviour of private agents, 
shocked by the financial crisis, returned to normal. At the end of 2012, once 
the impact of the shock had passed, federal debt as a proportion of GDP 
amounted to 70%, twice the pre-crisis figure and the highest ever known in 
the United States in peacetime. The unemployment rate, which was also 
twice its 2007 level, remained abnormally high: more than ever it was on 
monetary policy that the United States had to rely in order to bring the 
economy back to full employment.  
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5. OVERSTRETCHED MONETARY POLICY 
n the aftermath of World War II, when it entrusted the government with 
the task of keeping the economy at full employment, Congress was 
expecting it to rely more on fiscal policy than on monetary policy, a 
preference that seemed fully justified in light of wartime experience. The 
defence effort had led the government to increase spending by much more 
than the growth in revenue; by widening the deficit through borrowing, the 
government had provided a sharp stimulus to activity, even bringing the 
economy rapidly beyond the full-employment limit. Measures to control 
prices and borrowing were adopted in order to curb inflationary pressures, 
with monetary policy continuing to play an auxiliary role: the Federal 
Reserve simply had the task of buying Treasury securities in the amounts 
needed to keep down the cost of public borrowing. During the following 
decades, the mere idea that monetary policy could play a central role in the 
management of overall demand seemed incongruous to many Keynesian 
economists. J.K. Galbraith (1975) wrote: “Only the enemies of capitalism will 
hope that, in the future, this small, perverse and unpredictable lever will be 
a major instrument in economic management”.  
The limitations of fiscal policy, however, would soon become 
apparent: slow reaction time and lack of symmetry – raising tax rates or 
cutting public spending is often more difficult politically than the reverse – 
in fact make it unsuitable for fine-tuning the economy. Furthermore, as we 
have seen, the steady accumulation of budget deficits and off-balance-sheet 
commitments would soon reduce the government’s scope for borrowing. 
The fact that the American economy succeeded during almost a quarter of a 
century – from the mid-1980s to the eve of the great financial crisis – in 
remaining close to full employment while still keeping inflation under 
control could largely be put down to monetary policy. On closer inspection, 
this success should come as no surprise: the object of fine-tuning is to adjust 
growth in the demand for firms’ products to that of potential output. 
Government can admittedly make a direct contribution by increasing or 
reducing its expenditure, or a slightly less direct one by increasing or 
reducing taxation rates in the hope of seeing private agents’ spending track 
the evolution in their disposable income. On the other hand, monetary policy 
I 
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can arrive at the same result in a much more fluid manner. By adjusting the 
level of interest rates, the central bank can prompt private agents – 
households, in this case, as we are about to see – to increase or reduce 
spending. By this means, monetary policy is often better armed than fiscal 
policy to curb or accelerate the evolution in overall demand. In itself, the 
budget balance has no particular virtue: all things remaining equal, a rise in 
overall demand financed by additional borrowing will have the same effect 
on the economic situation regardless of whether the borrowing is public or 
private.  
While budgetary measures are in direct contact with overall demand, 
the same cannot be said of monetary policy, whose influence will depend on 
the financial system, through which impulses emanating from the central 
bank are transmitted, and the way in which private agents respond to them. 
In the course of recent decades, the United States has developed a 
mechanism for fine-tuning the economy by means of interest rates, in which 
household borrowing plays a central role. This ever more effective and 
powerful mechanism has enabled growth during some 20 years to remain at 
an astonishingly high level without any acceleration in inflation. This 
‘golden age’ for monetary policy unfortunately came to an end with the 
financial crisis that erupted towards the end of the 2000s and the risk of a 
new Great Depression could not have been avoided in the absence of 
massive budget support. The limits of monetary policy were clearly apparent 
and the capacity of the central bank to maintain the economy at full 
employment is today itself called into question.  
5.1 Household borrowing at the heart of economic regulation 
The mechanisms governing the fluctuations in American economic activity 
since World War II are relatively easy to identify. “Past recessions generally 
began after the Federal Reserve had raised interest rates sharply to counter 
excess inflation. When the Fed felt that it had succeeded, it reversed policy 
and lowered the interest rate. That was enough to trigger a recovery, driven 
in large part by the responsiveness of housing starts to lower interest rates” 
(Feldstein, 2009). Graph 32 gives a more precise and comprehensive picture 
of the mechanism involved. Variations in residential investment 
expenditure, largely financed by loans to households, were indeed of 
strikingly large amplitude. In periods of no more than a few quarters, their 
level has often risen or fallen by more than 10%. On their own, such 
variations, in response to a fall or a rise in interest rates, automatically 
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exerted a significant influence on economic activity: although residential 
investment until 2007 accounted, on average, for only 4% of domestic 
demand, this still meant that a 10% rise or fall was sufficient to alter overall 
demand by 0.4%. Nor was this the only impact of a change in interest rates: 
purchases of durable goods, notably cars, financed to a large extent on credit, 
were also affected. In their case, the response was slightly smaller and less 
rapid than for residential investment, but they accounted for twice the 
proportion of final demand, meaning that a variation of 8% in sales of 
durable goods altered overall demand by roughly 0.6%. 
It is worth noting that the response of corporate equipment 
investment, of the same order of magnitude as the consumption of durable 
goods, usually takes longer than in the case of residential investment. Far 
from responding immediately to variations in interest rates, corporate 
investment reacts to fluctuations in demand that are themselves triggered by the 
response of household spending to changes in interest rates (Brender et al., 2015). 
All in all, in the period up to the great financial crisis, by adjusting the level 
of interest rates and in so doing adjusting the spending of American 
households, the central bank enjoyed a capacity to curb or accelerate growth 
in overall demand that was considerably greater than that of fiscal policy. By 
way of comparison, in recent decades a rise (or fall) of at least 10% in the 
discretionary expenditure in the federal budget would be necessary to add 
(or subtract) 1% of overall demand. It would have been an illusion to count 
on Congress to vote in timely fashion measures on this scale with the sole 
aim of adjusting the evolution in demand to that of potential output!  
Graph 32. Fluctuations in GDP and components of final demand in the US, 
1960-2017 (y-o-y % changes) 
 
Sources: US Bureau of Economic Analysis and Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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With the passage of time, monetary policy has become de facto the 
principal instrument for regulating the American business cycle. By 
influencing the cost of household borrowing, it has provided incentives to 
bring forward (or put back, as the case may be) households’ life-cycle 
spending – purchase of a house or a car – with the aim of keeping the 
economy permanently as close as possible to full employment. However, this 
influence is far from being exerted directly: the role of the financial system is 
in fact decisive. The only interest rate set by the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) is the rate at which commercial banks lend to each other 
on a daily basis the reserves they hold with the Federal Reserve (known as 
fed funds). The Reserve Bank of New York – one of the 12 component 
districts of the Federal Reserve – has the task of intervening daily on the fed 
funds market to ensure that the interest rate formed there remains as close 
as possible to the one decided on. If the observed rate shows a tendency to 
rise above this target rate, operators on its trading desk purchase Treasury 
securities and the reserves of the commercial banks increase; if, on the 
contrary, it tends to fall below the target rate, the trading desk sells Treasury 
securities, which then leads to a reduction in the available reserves and hence 
to a rise in market rates. However, for the purposes of home purchases, 
American households do not borrow at overnight rates, which are close to 
the fed funds rate. For several decades now, home purchases have been 
largely financed by fixed-interest mortgages with relatively long maturities. 
The manner in which interest rates on these loans are set on the bond market 
plays a central role in the transmission of monetary policy. 
A mechanism for the transmission of monetary policy 
The component parts of the mechanism began to take shape well before 
World War I. At the end of the 19th century, most household borrowing was 
by farmers for the purpose of acquiring or exploiting land, which was 
mortgaged as a guarantee. During the life of the loan – rarely exceeding five 
years – the borrower paid only the interest and the repayment of capital took 
place as a lump sum at maturity. These farm mortgages helped finance the 
development of the Great Plains of North America. The loans distributed in 
this way were for the most part financed by saving, which was itself 
generated in the East Coast urban areas. These loans in fact had the 
particularity of being negotiable: once granted, they could be sold either 
directly to individual savers looking for remunerative investments or to life 
insurance firms in need of relatively long-term assets. The problem posed by 
the imperfect nature of the purchaser’s information regarding the borrower’s 
creditworthiness was resolved – for better or worse – in a number of different 
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ways: for example, the mortgage banker selling the loan could undertake to 
buy it back in the event of a payment incident; in other cases, the purchasers 
might rely simply on the banker’s reputation (and his desire to maintain it) 
(Snowden, 2014). 
This model – negotiability, relatively short duration, repayment on 
maturity – began at the beginning of the 20th century to be applied also in the 
case of the first residential mortgage loans. Despite the requirement of a large 
personal down payment, the deductibility of the interest payments from 
taxable income (introduced in 1913 at the same time as income tax itself) 
acted as a major fillip to recourse to borrowing and hence to residential 
construction: housing starts came to exceed 900,000 in 1925, a figure not seen 
again until after World War II. 
The Great Depression had catastrophic consequences for many 
borrowers. Unable to renew their loans at the time of maturity (as was 
usually the case), they found themselves threatened with foreclosure or 
forced to sell at a time of tumbling prices. Faced with this real estate crisis 
and the accompanying human tragedies, the government set up the Home 
Owner’s Loan Corporation (HOLC) and gave it the task of buying up 
delinquent loans and transforming them into 20-year fixed-rate fully-
amortising mortgages. In order to be able to sell these restructured loans (of 
which the HOLC had bought more than a million!), the government had no 
choice but to step in and itself underwrite them on payment of an insurance 
premium. This task was entrusted to the Federal Housing Administration 
(FHA), set up in 1936. At the same time, the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (FNMA), better known today as Fannie Mae, was given the task 
of supporting a secondary market for the underwritten loans. During several 
decades, these loans, paying higher interest than Treasury paper of the same 
maturity, would constitute a preferred asset for the banks, and above all for 
the savings banks whose function was to make loans to households. After 
the war, real estate loans would undergo a new phase of expansion, with 
further measures instituted to facilitate home ownership.  
The channels created in the wake of the New Deal making deposits, 
especially those of the savings banks, the principal source of financing for 
real estate loans, were unable to withstand the rise of inflation. In the mid-
1960s, the Fed was obliged, for the first time since the Great Depression, to 
raise its benchmark rate above 4% (Graph 33). To prevent a steep rise in 
mortgage rates, the authorities decided to place a cap on the remuneration 
of deposits with the savings banks as well. By itself, however, this measure 
had no chance of dissuading savers from preferring to invest in Treasury 
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paper, now distinctly more remunerative: the Savings and Loans, seeing 
their resources diminishing, then reduced their lending.7 In 1968, the 
government reacted by splitting Fannie Mae in two. Alongside a 
Government National Mortgage Association (better known as Ginnie Mae), 
which inherited its initial tasks and statute, a new Fannie Mae was created. 
Now a private organisation but sponsored by the government (in other 
words, a Government Sponsored Enterprise (GSE)), its task was to buy and 
then itself guarantee mortgage loans, financing these by means of bond 
issues; at the same time, it was asked to devote a reasonable proportion of its 
resources to the purchase of loans made to families living on modest 
incomes. This public sponsorship, combined with certain other privileges, 
would give the impression that this entity, listed on the stock market, 
benefited – implicitly, at least – from a US government guarantee. By 
creating this new Fannie Mae, the government’s aim was, on the one hand, 
to lighten the federal debt and, on the other, to unify the financing of 
residential real estate. Two years later, in order to introduce an element of 
competition, the government acted as ‘sponsor’ to another institution with 
an identical statute and vocation,8 namely, the Federal Home Loan Mortgage 
Corporation (named, for the sake of symmetry, Freddie Mac). At the 
beginning of the 1970s the embryo of a powerful mechanism for the 
transmission of monetary policy was in place. In the following decades, a 
wave of financial innovation was to accelerate its development while at the 
same time the central bank learned to master its use.  
Graph 33. Inflation, fed funds rate and US Treasury bond rate, 1960-2017 (%) 
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
                                                   
7 Twenty years later, an even more severe crisis hit the savings banks, when they 
again had to face an increase in short-term rates while they had lent long-term at a 
fixed rate. 
8 For a complete history of this evolution, see Green & Wachter (2005). 
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5.2 A (short-lived) golden age of monetary policy 
By issuing bonds for the purpose of purchasing and holding loans, Fannie 
Mae and Freddie Mac would contribute to a far-reaching transformation of 
the conditions for mortgage lending in the United States. Having long been 
financed by the resources invested short term with deposit institutions, 
housing loans could from now on be financed by the issuance of long-term 
debt. These issues would take two forms: first, the GSEs would issue bonds 
to finance loans that would then be kept in their portfolios; second, they 
would put together pools of loans for securitisation. These pools would then 
be sold on to ad hoc vehicles that would finance the purchases through the 
issue of debt securities. The payment of interest and capital on these 
securities would be ensured by payments received from the households 
whose loans the vehicle had acquired. The holders of the bonds issued in this 
way as the counterpart to a pool of mortgage loans – mortgage-backed 
securities (MBS) – would be guaranteed by the GSEs against the risk of 
borrower default but not against the risks linked to variations in interest 
rates (for the holders, these stocks carried, in particular, the risk of early 
repayment in the event of a fall in interest rates).  
This securitisation, whose development would be facilitated by the 
financial deregulation launched during the 1970s, would not only modify the 
nature of the resources used to finance housing loans. It would also bring 
about the unification, throughout the whole of the United States, of the 
conditions for lending to households, especially in the form of mortgages, at 
interest rates that would become ever more closely linked to those of the 
bond market. Between the end of the 1970s and the beginning of the 1990s, 
in parallel with the progress of securitisation, the link between interest rates 
on US Treasury bonds and on American mortgages was tightened (Brender 
& Pisani, 2004). The consequences of this evolution for monetary policy 
would gradually emerge, with the influence of short-term rates on the 
conditions for mortgage lending waning and that of long-term rates 
increasing. These long-term rates are determined each day on the bond 
market and are much less sensitive to the Federal Reserve’s key rates than 
are short-term rates. Long-term rates – for 10, 20 or 30 years – are in fact not 
a function only of today’s key rates, but also reflect expectations of what 
these rates will be, on average, during the coming 10, 20 or 30 years.9 This 
                                                   
9 Ignoring transaction costs, an operator must regard as equivalent, for example, 
making a loan for two years or making one for one year and reinvesting the proceeds 
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means that mortgage rates will be increasingly sensitive to the markets’ 
perception of what monetary policy will be in the coming years. 
The Fed learns how to communicate with the bond markets 
It took a few years for the Federal Reserve to learn how it could benefit from 
this evolution. Convincing operators on the bond market that it would not 
allow inflation to accelerate, as it had done throughout the 1970s, would 
become a priority: by limiting the volume of reserves placed at the disposal 
of the banks, Paul Volcker, appointed as Chairman of the Federal Reserve in 
1979, literally brought about an explosion in the fed funds rate – to more than 
20% in 1980 – and stopped in its tracks the tendency for prices to drift up 
more rapidly – at the cost of a brutal recession. But he was unsuccessful in 
persuading the markets that the Fed would snuff out any future rise: the 
almost constant fall of inflation during the 1980s would not rule out episodic 
‘inflation scares’ (Goodfriend, 1993). On several occasions, the markets, 
fearing a return of inflation, would force interest rates, and hence mortgage 
rates, sharply upwards. Alan Greenspan, who succeeded Paul Volcker in 
1987, managed to eliminate these uncontrolled movements in long-term 
rates by launching, in 1994, a pre-emptive strike: in order not to repeat the 
errors of the 1970s, the Fed, noting that the economy had emerged from 
recession, took the decision, despite the fact that inflation was not 
accelerating, to raise its key rates step by step. This action was not 
understood by the markets. Far from reassuring them, the rise made them 
fear the worst and long-term rates rose sharply.  
This bond market crash placed an undesirably brutal curb on the 
distribution of mortgage loans and hence on residential investment. The Fed 
learned an essential lesson from this experience: given that it is long-term 
rates that influence the business cycle, the manner in which it communicates 
with the markets where these rates are formed becomes crucial. It therefore 
rapidly improved its practices in this respect. The previously laconic 
communiqués issued after each FOMC meeting were replaced by more 
precise and detailed reports. Not only, from 1995 on, would the target set for 
the fed funds figure specifically in the communiqué, but there would also be 
                                                   
(capital and interest) at a rate that is already known. For this to be the case, the two-
year rate must be the ‘mean’ of the current one-year rate and the currently expected 
one-year rate a year into the future. This reasoning can easily be generalised to 
longer periods. It explains the link between a long-term rate and the schedule of 
short-term rates expected between the present and the maturity concerned. 
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a succinct analysis of the state of the economy and an indication regarding 
the future evolution of key rates. The regular presentations of the Chairman 
to Congress, or statements in the press by himself and other board members, 
would rapidly permit the introduction of a genuine language of 
communication between the central bank and the bond market operators, 
enabling them to be increasingly adept at divining forthcoming movements 
in key rates. 
The bond market becomes a powerful stabiliser of activity 
During the second part of the 1990s, the markets would function as a real 
built-in stabiliser of the economy. If activity seemed set to grow slightly 
faster than the Fed would like, market operators made upward revisions in 
their expectations of future key rates, long-term rates would rise accordingly 
and lending to households would be curbed, without the central bank’s 
having to lift a finger. And the same would apply in reverse if there were a 
threat of too great a slowdown. The Asian economic crisis that began in 1997 
provided proof of the efficacy of the cyclical stabiliser that had come into 
existence. The collapse of US exports to the emerging regions was on such a 
scale that recession seemed unavoidable. The markets accordingly expected 
key rates to fall sharply and, even before they were reduced by the Fed, an 
appreciable fall in long rates took place. This in turn provided a sufficient 
boost to residential investment (and to purchases of durables) for growth to 
withstand the shock. In 1998, the sharp fall in external demand for products 
of US firms was entirely compensated by a vigorous acceleration in domestic 
demand, due in particular to a sharp rise in residential investment. The final 
upshot was that growth was at the same rate, 4%, as in the previous year.  
When in 2001 the stock market bubble that had been swelling 
throughout the previous decade finally burst, the US economy was 
confronted with an even more dramatic menace. In size, this bubble was 
comparable to the one that triggered the depression of the 1930s and, as on 
that previous occasion, its formation had been accompanied by 
overinvestment on the part of firms, euphoric about the prospect opened up 
by new technologies. There was therefore every chance that the correction of 
the accumulated excesses would provoke a deep recession: the fall in prices 
of equities inevitably put a brake on spending by the households owning 
them and there was a likelihood that firms that had over-expanded their 
production capacity would make drastic cuts in their investment spending. 
Faced with the risk of collapse of domestic demand, the mechanisms for the 
transmission of monetary policy would then reveal their full potential: 
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despite the falls on the stock market and in corporate investment, spending 
by households, contrary to what might have been feared, remained buoyant. 
Admittedly, the income tax cuts referred to in the previous chapter 
(promised in 2000 during George W. Bush’s election campaign) were partly 
responsible for this, but it was mainly due to the steep and lasting fall in 
bond rates: the Fed’s guiding of market expectations played a decisive role 
in this respect.  
As early as 1999, Alan Greenspan had explained that central banks 
could not prevent the formation of stock market bubbles, but they could at 
least mitigate the damages when they burst. This being so, the decline in 
long-term rates would track that of the equity market: in conformity with the 
indications received, bond markets expected a decline in key rates 
proportional to the damage that the collapse in prices was expected to cause. 
The stabilising effects were immediate: as in 1998, households took 
advantage of the fall in rates to borrow and their spending was boosted as a 
result. At the same time, those who had borrowed prior to the crisis exploited 
their early repayment options to borrow at a lower rate; the purchasing 
power released by the decline in their interest burden also helped to 
underpin domestic spending. Later, when the stock market ceased to fall and 
an upturn in activity started to take shape, the Fed was anxious to prevent 
an excessively rapid rise in bond rates from aborting the upturn. This it did 
by again giving explicit indications regarding its policy: over a period of 
more than six months, the communiqués published following each FOMC 
meeting stated that key rates would remain low “for a considerable period”. 
The Fed in fact waited until it regarded the upturn as firmly established and 
job creation as robust before launching, in the summer of 2004, a gradual rise 
in its key rate10: despite the extreme violence of the shock, the Fed was 
successful in preventing the economy from deviating too far from full 
employment. The unemployment rate, which had fallen to 4% in 2000, had 
almost returned to this level in 2007, after rising to 6% for only a few months 
– and 6% was a level that had long been regarded as corresponding to full 
employment! Alan Greenspan had reinforced his reputation as a magician.  
                                                   
10 The mention of “a considerable period” disappeared from the communiqué in 
January 2004, but the actual rise in policy rates began only at the end of June of that 
year. Surprisingly – there was talk of a “conundrum” – for several months long-term 
rates failed to react to the monetary tightening. For once, the bond market would 
have been of no help to the Federal Reserve.  
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A continuous rise in household borrowing, in response to deflationary 
pressures 
Looked at more closely, the performance is even more remarkable than at 
first sight. These years were a period when the American economy had to 
cope with more than just the shocks mentioned above. From the end of the 
1990s on, as was described in Chapter II, an increasing share of its domestic 
demand was progressively captured by the rest of the world, China in 
particular. Everything else remaining unchanged, this evolution was the 
source of deflationary pressure for the US economy and ought to have led to 
a rise in unemployment (Brender & Pisani, 2010). With imports steadily 
increasing, an ever-greater share of domestic demand, instead of 
underpinning domestic activity, in fact sustained that of the rest of the world. 
The fact that, even so, the economy did not move further from full 
employment can be ascribed to the monetary policy then being 
implemented, which generated sufficient additional demand to compensate 
also for this flight of part of US spending to the rest of the world. Faced with 
the emerging Asian countries’ development strategy, the opening up of trade 
accepted by the United States left the central bank with no choice: if it was to 
try to maintain full employment at home, it also had to agree to sustain 
activity in China. Household borrowing increased correspondingly. There 
can be no better illustration of this than the link observed until 2007 between 
the increase in the flow of mortgage lending and the widening of the US 
current account deficit (Graph 34). 
Graph 34. US household borrowing and current account balance, 1960-2017 
(% of GDP)  
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
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manufactured goods from low-wage countries but also of the steady rise of 
the oil price during this period. Here again, this rise, by siphoning off an ever 
increasing fraction of US domestic demand for the benefit of the rest of the 
world, might have been expected to depress domestic activity (as at the time 
of the previous oil shocks). But this did not happen. Until 2007, the US 
economy was able to pay for the increase in its oil bill without having to 
reduce other spending, thanks to a further increase in household borrowing. 
Given that the Fed’s objective was to keep the economy running at full 
employment, the policy it implemented was the only one possible. While 
justified at the macroeconomic level, it led to a catastrophe, not because key 
rates remained too low for too long, but because liberal ideology brought 
about a systematic refusal to recognise the accompanying accumulation of 
risks.  
Box 6. The dollar and the US net external position 
In large measure, borrowing by US agents, which gathered pace from the end 
of the 1990s on, was in fact financed by the rest of the world. In 2006 the US 
current account deficit reached almost 6% of GDP. In that year, the country 
absorbed foreign saving amounting to almost $800 billion. The phenomenon 
was not new in itself: ever since the abandonment of the Bretton Woods 
system, the United States had been accumulating deficit after deficit and its 
net external position – the difference between its holdings of assets from the 
rest of the world and the latter’s holdings of its own assets – had steadily 
deteriorated. After being practically in equilibrium in 1970, this position 
turned negative in 2017, to the tune of the equivalent of more than 40% of 
GDP. Despite this spectacular deterioration, the dollar’s exchange rate vis-à-
vis the country’s trading partners, when allowance is made for inflation, was 
almost unchanged from what it had been 40 years earlier (Graph 35).  
Graph 35. Current account balance, dollar exchange rate and US net external 
position, 1960-2016 (% of GDP)  
 
Sources: Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations. 
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The United States’ capacity for accumulating ‘deficits without tears’ is 
not a new phenomenon. Initially, it was linked to the preferential situation of 
the dollar within the monetary system set in place at Bretton Woods. With the 
development of international trade, central banks throughout the world 
purchased dollars to build up their exchange reserves and later to peg their 
exchange rates. The abandonment of fixed parities then changed things. The 
fact that the United States continued to enjoy ‘deficits without tears’ was in 
large part due to the behaviour of other countries which, despite running 
substantial current account surpluses, decided to maintain a fixed exchange 
rate for their currencies versus the dollar.* But it was also due to the fact that 
from the 1980s onwards, the deregulation of capital movements enabled 
developed country residents to diversify their portfolios of financial assets. As 
a result, the impact of current account imbalances on exchange rates was 
weakened, both for the dollar and other major currencies (Brender & Pisani, 
2010).  
The rise in the assets held by the United States with the rest of the world 
gives an idea of the size of this increase in financial openness: on the eve of 
the great financial crisis, the amount of these assets, as a ratio of US GDP, was 
more than five times what it had been in the mid-1970s. US liabilities vis-à-vis 
the rest of the world naturally increased still more rapidly: in 2017 these were 
equivalent to more than 1½ times US GDP (Graph 36). The evolution in the 
prices – expressed in dollars – of the various components of these liabilities, 
and also of US assets, nevertheless meant that the deterioration in the net 
external position was not quite as great as the build-up of US current account 
deficits would have implied on its own. 
Graph 36. Composition of the US net external position, 1976-2016 (% of GDP) 
 
* US foreign exchange reserves are included in the “other investments” item. 
Sources: Federal Reserve; Bureau of Economic Analysis and authors’ calculations.  
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the 1960s, reserves held by other central banks with the United States 
therefore enabled the latter to finance foreign direct investment by US firms. 
In recent decades, purchases by the rest of the world of relatively safe debt 
securities – those issued by the US Treasury or by GSEs regarded as carrying 
its guarantee – financed riskier investments by the United States in the rest of 
the world, both direct investment and equity purchases. Another similarity 
with the function of banker was that the United States continuously held 
assets that were better remunerated than their liabilities. This margin, i.e. an 
interest rate differential of almost two points, explains why, despite the 
substantial net negative position, the balance on primary income was always 
in surplus. The difference between the remuneration on US investments in the 
rest of the world and the one paid to the rest of the world on the capital it 
supplied them with still amounted in 2017 to 1% of GDP.  
However, financial globalisation tended to blur this image of the United 
States as the world’s banker. For one thing, the rest of the world began to make 
an increasing amount of risky investment in the United States (equity 
purchases, direct investment) without any reduction in the net margin 
achieved by the country. This can also be seen for each major asset class. For 
example, the yield on United States foreign direct investment was 
systematically higher than on foreign investment in the United States. For 
another, the US position as risk-taker diminished substantially, to the point 
that its position as net investor in risky assets is now virtually nil. All that 
remains is its ever more important position as net issuer of relatively risk-free 
assets (bonds). The world’s banker now borrows mainly to finance its own 
deficit. 
__________________________ 
* This has long been true of the Middle East oil producers and, more recently, of China (the 
yuan’s exchange rate only began to float – just a little – against the dollar in 2005).  
 
5.3 An accumulation of excess and imprudence 
During ten or so years, US monetary policy enabled activity, permanently 
hampered by headwinds, to grow at more or less its potential rate. The 
inevitable side-effect of this policy was to bring about a rise in household 
borrowing. When a rise of this kind results from a temporary fall in interest 
rates aimed at palliating a short-lived weakness in demand, this need not be 
cause for concern. The low interest rates then simply induce those who were 
preparing to borrow in order to purchase a car or a house, drawing on future 
income, to do so sooner rather than later. When domestic demand picks up 
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again, interest rates will recover and those who have recently borrowed will 
not do so a second time! If their incomes and down payments are adequate 
and if they have habitually met their financial commitments (a situation 
measured by their credit score), there is a reasonable likelihood that the 
contracted loans will be repaid. This was true for many years in the case of 
the loans guaranteed and later securitised by the GSEs, which fulfilled 
certain relatively exacting quality criteria – those used to define prime loans 
– and the observed delinquency rates were low (Frame et al., 2015). 
Increasingly relaxed lending norms 
On the other hand, if interest rates remain relatively low for a long period, 
as was the case in the early 2000s, households meeting these quality criteria 
and wanting to finance by borrowing an item of life-cycle expenditure will 
already have done so. In order for household borrowing to continue to 
underpin activity, it is necessary for other borrowers, in their turn, to have 
recourse to credit in order to finance new expenditure, and so on. But for 
these new loans to be made, borrowing criteria have to be less exacting. The 
increased distribution of lower quality loans – sub-primes – was the 
hallmark of the early 2000s. Once the needs of creditworthy borrowers had 
been met, the financial system turned its attention to the demands of 
borrowers who were less so. The GSEs were participants in this, attracted by 
the potential profits but also at the instigation of the government, which, 
from the mid-1990s on, wanted to develop home ownership by poorer 
families, especially those belonging to minority groups. The development of 
‘private label’ securitisation also played a major role, however. Until then, 
the securitisation channels that did not have the benefit of a guarantee from 
Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were fed mainly by loans for amounts exceeding 
the limits set for GSE purchases. These large loans (jumbo mortgages) could 
nevertheless still be of prime quality. The early 2000s saw the rapid 
development of private securitisation of sub-prime loans (England, 2006). 
These loans were highly diverse in nature but had one thing in common: 
they enabled households failing to meet the usual creditworthiness criteria 
(for prime loans) to borrow money. Activity was therefore enabled to 
continue to grow at a firm rate, at the cost of a constant rise in the volume of 
household debt, which in the space of ten years rose by the equivalent of 
more than 40 percentage points of disposable income!  
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A steady climb in real estate prices 
Given that, in the period up to the financial crisis, the transmission of 
monetary policy to the real economy had to a large extent operated through 
mortgage borrowing by households, this policy necessarily had as a 
secondary effect to force up prices of residential real estate. In fact, far from 
financing only purchases of new housing and, in so doing, increasing the 
demand for construction sector products, roughly three-quarters of 
household borrowing was to finance the acquisition of an existing property. 
Certainly, such acquisitions were normally followed by a refurbishment or 
renovation, but in this case the impact on activity would be much smaller.  
That this still enables a fall in interest rates to make a powerful 
contribution to sustaining activity is because it is not generally the end of the 
process: the purchase of an existing dwelling often in turn leads the seller to 
become a buyer and also in many cases a borrower. A chain of transactions 
will be created, each link of which will in one way or another generate 
additional spending that will underpin activity. Inasmuch as this chain of 
transactions will mainly involve existing dwellings, each element in the 
chain will also tend to force prices up (Graph 37), given that the stock of 
residential real estate can only grow through new construction. 
Graph 37. Household mortgage borrowing and real estate prices in the US, 
1970-2016  
 
Source: Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
Here again, if interest rates remain low for only a brief period, the 
resultant pressure on prices will be temporary and disappear once monetary 
policy becomes more restrictive. The same will not be true if rates remain 
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continuation of the rise. This they will do all the more easily in that lending 
conditions are relatively unexacting. The upshot was that, between 1998 and 
2006, housing prices rose continuously – doubling during this period – and 
the gap between the rise in these prices and the rise in average household 
disposable income – the latter being less than half the former in nominal 
terms – was unprecedentedly high for so long a period! 
Blind faith in market discipline 
The continuous rise in household borrowing over a full decade had one final 
consequence that needs to be mentioned, namely the build-up in highly 
precarious conditions of a huge quantity of risks within the financial system. 
This borrowing in fact had as a counterpart, as has been shown, an 
accumulation of securitised mortgage debt, the holding of which, as for any 
credit, carried risk. Admittedly, these securities were backed by real estate 
assets, but these assets were themselves valued at prices that were rising 
rapidly and, in the event of a downturn, the small size of the down payments 
made by a large number of borrowers meant that creditors had little effective 
protection. Nor was the credit risk the only one needing to be borne. A 
mortgage security in fact carries the same risks as a bond: a liquidity risk 
(there is no possibility of asking for repayment before maturity) and an 
interest rate risk (given that bond rates vary daily in response to the market). 
The outstanding amount of household debt could not have risen as it did 
had the US financial system not contained operators willing to carry the huge 
amount of risks implied by this accumulation of debt. 
Financial inventiveness made a major contribution in this respect, by 
concocting, on the basis of this securitised paper, other products whose 
credit risk was difficult to assess. At the same time, the quest for profit led 
numerous operators – hedge funds, investment banks, off-balance-sheet 
vehicles set up by the commercial banks, etc. – to take the additional risk of 
borrowing short-term to purchase these securities, using them as collateral. 
In this way they were able to benefit from the margin between their 
remuneration and the cost of the borrowing with which they had been 
purchased. These risk-takers therefore clearly bore part of the risks 
generated by the mass of accumulated debt. This activity on their part has 
often been described as shadow banking (Brender & Pisani, 2010). In certain 
respects, it could be regarded as having a certain resemblance to that of a 
deposit bank bearing the risks of the loans it makes as the counterpart of the 
deposits it takes in. However, the analogy is deceptive: if at some stage these 
risk-takers were refused the loans needed to continue to hold the purchased 
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stocks, they would have no alternative but to sell them; a deposit bank, on 
the other hand, can always borrow from the central bank if it finds itself short 
of liquidity. Above all, a deposit bank is subjected to prudential rules and 
oversight, which was far from being the case for the shadow banking risk-
takers. Quite on the contrary, the very idea that their activity might be the 
subject of oversight by the authorities was strongly opposed, by Alan 
Greenspan (2007) in particular: surveillance of these shadow bankers by their 
counterparties should be quite sufficient!  
A catastrophic outturn 
This blind confidence in market discipline, just when debts and risk were 
constantly accumulating, ended in catastrophe. The increasing number of 
defaults on sub-prime loans, which from the beginning of 2007 onwards 
could no longer be ignored, led first to a reduction and then to a complete 
drying up of lending to the risk-takers, who were obliged, for want of being 
able to renew their loans, to sell at least part of their security holdings, those 
of poor quality as long as they could, but later the better ones as well. This 
triggered a chain reaction. Faced with what was soon to become a general 
collapse in the prices of the securities used as collateral, the risk-takers, 
holding high-quality stocks, were now obliged to sell these as well. Rapidly, 
a number of large institutions with well-established names found themselves 
unable to cope with their funding needs. This was the case for the Bear 
Stearns investment bank, saved from bankruptcy in extremis by the Fed in 
April 2008, and a few months later for Lehman Brothers, which was not so 
lucky! By the fall of 2008, the reality had to be faced: imprudent private 
operators and complaisant authorities had enabled the financial system to 
accumulate much more risk than it was capable of bearing. In a knee-jerk 
panic reaction, the system tried to rid itself of the excess risk by a wave of 
selling – at a time when no one was willing or able to buy: left to itself, the 
US financial system was threatened with implosion. 
The Fed took decisive action: it agreed to take over from private 
operators part of the risk they were no longer able to bear by purchasing 
between December 2008 and March 2010 almost $2 trillion worth of 
securities (long-term US Treasury bonds and especially stocks issued or 
guaranteed by the GSEs). The injection of liquidity that was the counterpart 
of these purchases automatically led to a rise in the reserves of the 
commercial banks. In this way, the Fed purely and simply replaced the 
failing private risk-takers, taking over from them part of the risks they were 
no longer able to bear, while at the same time borrowing from the banks the 
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sums that the financial system was no longer lending to the private risk-
takers. By taking over from the system part of its burden of liquidity and 
interest rate risks, the central bank was able to prevent its collapse.  
On the other hand, it was unable to prevent the real economy from 
being violently affected by the seizing-up of the financial system that 
accompanied the crisis. The flow of household borrowing dried up overnight 
and this threatened to bring about a violent contraction in total demand and 
a very real risk of deflation on as dramatic a scale as that seen between the 
wars. It took another public intervention to prevent this. The federal 
government used its budget to try to stabilise activity. In other words, 
growth in government borrowing replaced growth in household borrowing. 
Since monetary policy as implemented during more than two decades had 
become inoperative, the central bank would be obliged to continue to have 
recourse to unconventional measures to help lift the economy out of the 
Great Recession that followed the financial crisis. 
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6. LOST DYNAMISM? 
he recession that began at the end of 2008 was the most severe of the 
post-war period. By 2010, the unemployment rate had reached 10% 
and it was not until 2017 that it regained its 2007 level. The upturn that 
followed the financial crisis was itself also the slowest of recent decades and 
the weak growth of the 2010s is in sharp contrast to the firmer recoveries of 
the three preceding decades. This weakness rapidly led to questions 
regarding the evolution of the US economy’s growth potential: was it now 
condemned to sluggish growth simply because it had already fully exploited 
the principal sources of technical progress? This may seem a strange 
question at a moment when every day seems to bring a fresh crop of 
innovations. Be that as it may. If unemployment was able to fall in the United 
States during the 2010s, despite mediocre growth, it was because 
productivity growth was exceptionally weak. In part at least, this weakness 
of productivity gains reflected firms’ response to the weakness of demand 
for their products: in an economy where the pressure of demand is low, firms 
have little reason to invest. And this leads to a final key question: how can 
one bring about a lasting revival in activity in an economy where the 
instruments habitually used to achieve this – monetary policy and fiscal 
policy – have demonstrated their limitations?  
6.1 Weakened growth potential 
Since the start of the present century, US growth has slowed substantially. 
After ranging between 3 and 4% during the second half of the 20th century, 
it fell to 2.4% during the years preceding the financial crisis and to 1.5% in 
the decade that followed it. Inasmuch as the low unemployment rate (close 
to 4% in both 2000 and 2017) suggests that the economy in these years was 
practically at full employment, it is tempting to see in this distinct slowdown 
the reflection of an ever-slower growth in potential output. In an economy 
already at an advanced stage of development, there is nothing particularly 
surprising, of course, about such a slowdown. What is surprising is its 
abruptness in the US case, as well as its revelation of worrying developments 
in both the supply of manpower and in labour productivity. 
T 
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A distinct slowdown in the growth of manpower supply 
In part, the slowdown in the growth of manpower supply is due to 
demographic factors. In the first place, the birth rate was almost halved in 
the space of around 50 years (from more than 23 per 1,000 in 1960 to 12.4 per 
1,000 in 2015), with the result that natural population growth is today barely 
0.4% per annum. It is only the maintenance of a continuing strong 
immigration flow that has enabled the US population to continue to grow at 
a rate not much below 1%. In the absence of a radical change in migration 
policy, even this rate is bound to slow in the coming decades. Next, growth 
in the population of working age is currently being held back by the arrival 
of the baby boomers at retirement age and this effect will not entirely fade 
before 2030. By weighing down the participation rate (the proportion of the 
population of working age consisting of people who are either working or 
seeking employment), this ageing process also acts as a curb on growth in 
the population liable to be employed. Participation rates in fact differ widely 
depending on the age group: in 2017, the rate for the over-55s was only 40%, 
while that of the 25-54 group was twice as great. The BLS has calculated the 
impact on the participation rate to be expected as a result of a continuation 
of ageing: from close to 63% in 2017, it is expected to fall to 59% in 2030. On 
its own, this fall will reduce growth in the labour force by almost 0.4% a year 
during the 2020s. The overall result would then be growth in labour supply 
in the next decade that would remain, at best, close to 0.5% a year, as in the 
2010s (Toossi, 2016).  
The impact of these demographic tendencies is compounded by that of 
other, more worrying, factors. During the upturn of the 2010s, the 
participation rate of the prime working-age population – workers aged 
between 25 and 54 – is far from having moved in a normal manner. While 
this rate, after falling sharply, did indeed finally climb back somewhat, as is 
normally the case when activity picks up again, most of this movement was 
accounted for by the female participation rate, with the male rate in 2017 still 
two points lower than in 2006. Since the mid-1950s, this participation rate 
has in fact steadily declined, falling from 98% to 88% in 2017. It is currently 
among the lowest of all the developed countries and its decline has been the 
sharpest. Unsurprisingly, it has been distinctly more marked in the case of 
the least educated male workers: in the mid-1960s, the participation rate for 
workers with a high school degree or less was similar to that of workers with 
a university qualification; in 2017, it was 10 points lower! This tendency 
seems to have above all affected men born in the United States: the 
participation rate for foreign-born prime-age men with less than high school 
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education was still close to 90% in 2016, compared to less than 70% for those 
born in the United States. A point less frequently stressed is that the decline 
in the participation rate occurred earlier and more rapidly in the case of black 
men aged between 25 and 54: having been twice as steep during the first half 
of the 1990s, it then continued at the same rate as for white men. 
The decline in the participation rate for prime-age males is likely to be 
difficult to reverse. It is partly the consequence of the developments 
described above. Automation and competition from low-wage countries 
have destroyed thousands of jobs in manufacturing, most of them occupied 
by male workers. The decline in their participation rate in turn reflects the 
disruption of parts of US society that has accompanied these changes. 
Krueger (2017) highlights the fact that 20% of males in the prime-age cohort 
who leave the active population have difficulty in walking or climbing stairs 
and almost as many have difficulty in concentrating. Half take painkillers 
daily. According to a 2016 BLS survey, illness and disability are the reasons 
most frequently given by these males to explain their inactivity (55%, 
compared to 25% for females) (Krause & Sawhill, 2017).  
The phenomenon is all the more worrying in that a growing fraction 
of the population now lies outside the scope of these statistics. The working-
age population used to calculate the participation rate excludes individuals 
in prison, for example. And yet the incarceration rate, having risen very 
rapidly during the 1980s and 1990s, was in 2016 five times as high for the 
United States as for the average of the OECD countries (almost 700 per 
100,000 inhabitants). Here again those most affected are black men and 
workers with the least qualifications. Their chances of finding a job on release 
from prison are often very few – except when the labour market is 
exceptionally tight, as it was, very briefly, at the beginning of the 2000s.  
Not only demographics but also the reaction of part of the working-
age population to the contraction in employment that followed the financial 
crisis have facilitated the adjustment of the labour market to the weakness of 
the upturn that began in 2010: by reducing by half a point the growth rate of 
the supply of labour, the fall in the participation rate, for whatever reason, 
hastened the return of the unemployment rate to a level corresponding to 
relatively full employment. The same could not be said of the years 
preceding the financial crisis: between 2000 and 2007, it was mainly through 
a decline in the average number of hours worked that growth managed to 
generate jobs at a time when hourly labour productivity was continuing to 
grow at a firm rate and when the participation rate was showing practically 
no signs of weakening. The post-crisis period saw a radical change in this 
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respect as well: apart from the fall in the participation rate, the return to full 
employment was this time due not to an adjustment in the hours worked but 
to a sharp decline in the rate of productivity gains. 
Graph 38. Growth, employment and labour productivity*, 1950-2017 (%) 
 
* Productivity and hours worked are for the non-farm business sector. Business sector output 
is a chain-type, current-weighted index constructed after excluding from gross domestic 
product (GDP) the following outputs: general government, non-profit institutions, and 
private households (including owner-occupied housing).  
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Weaker productivity gains… 
Since the end of World War II, even ignoring purely cyclical influences, the 
rate of productivity gains has been far from stable. After growing rapidly 
until 1973, by more than 3% a year, productivity rose much less rapidly 
between 1973 and 1995, a period affected by two oil shocks and one oil 
counter-shock. It then picked up substantially, exceeding 3% a year for 
almost 10 years – corresponding to a New Age for the US economy, driven 
by the new information technologies – before slowing down again starting 
in the mid-2000s (Graph 39).  
In order to have a more precise idea of the reasons for this evolution in 
labour productivity, it is possible, to isolate the respective contributions of, 
first, the improvement in the quality of labour and in firms’ investment 
efforts, and, second, growth in total factor productivity (TFP), due notably 
to technical changes. It then turns out that firms’ investment efforts, in the 
broad sense, have never made as small a contribution as since the crisis. 
Whereas on average, since the beginning of the 1950s, the contribution to 
growth in labour productivity of the rise in capital intensity – measured as 
the capital applied per hour worked – was around one percentage point per 
year since 2000, this contribution has been steadily falling to practically zero 
(Graph 39)! This slowdown in the investment effort – affecting both 
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traditional equipment and computer hardware and software – on its own 
explains more than one-third of the decline in productivity gains since the 
financial crisis. Even so, inasmuch as the contribution from the improvement 
in the quality of manpower has remained relatively stable, the bulk of this 
slowdown in labour productivity growth can be seen to be due to an ever 
slower rise in total factor productivity – which is astonishing given the 
innovations available in many sectors. 
Graph 39. Contributions to the growth in labour productivity, 1948-2016 (%) 
 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
… due in particular to weaker total factor productivity 
The contribution of total factor productivity is measured by the portion of 
labour productivity gains that is attributable to neither the improvement of 
the quality of labour nor to that of capital intensity. After growing rapidly 
during the period 1995-2007, this contribution has since returned to the more 
modest rate seen in the 1970s and 1980s (+0.5% per year). Because it is 
defined as a residual, it is particularly sensitive to measurement errors, 
whether these relate to the quality of labour, the quantity of capital applied 
or the volume of production itself. Numerous studies have been made of the 
possible consequences of these errors. The conclusions are often the same, 
namely that it is difficult to consider that these problems have become more 
important than in the past (Byrne et al., 2016; Syverson, 2016). And it is only 
in the event of their worsening that the recent slowdown in TFP could have 
been significantly overestimated.  
The less easily measurable nature of the output of certain service 
sectors whose importance in the economy has been tending to increase is also 
often invoked. This is the case, in particular, for education and healthcare, 
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but also for finance. Disappointing evolutions in TFP are by no means 
confined to output in these sectors, however: of the 72 sub-sectors for which 
a tendency in TFP can be calculated, two-thirds showed a slowdown after 
the crisis whereas three-quarters had accelerated during the previous decade 
(Baily & Montalbano, 2016). In fact, only a handful of sectors are currently 
experiencing TFP growth – finance, information and communication and the 
mining sector – and their contributions are modest, to say the least 
(Graph 40). In the sectors where output is more easily measurable – 
distribution or manufacturing – there has been no progress in TFP since the 
crisis. This means that the evolution in the sectoral composition of the 
economy cannot affect the conclusion, either. Calculating TFP with 
unchanged sector weightings compared with 1987 modifies neither the 
acceleration observed between 1995 and 2004 nor the slowdown that has 
occurred since then (for this calculation the periods chosen have been those 
in the study by Fernald (2014), which serves as a reference in this case). 
Graph 40. Annual growth in total factor productivity by sector and sub-period (%) 
 
Note on reading the graphs: The horizontal axis shows for each of the 11 sectors of the first level 
NAICS breakdown the average annual growth rate of TFP for the period 1987-2015. The 
vertical axis shows for the same sector the growth of its TFP during three sub-periods: 1987-
1995 in the left-hand graph; 1995-2004 in the middle graph; 2004-15 in the right-hand graph. 
When a sector’s location is above the diagonal, this means that productivity growth was 
greater in the sub-period than in the years 1987-2015. The surface area of each circle is 
proportional to the weight of the sector in GDP. 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Obviously, it is by no means certain that this stagnation in productivity 
gains is set to last: for one thing, the benefits from major innovations can be 
slow in coming. Syverson (2013) highlights the fact that the fluctuations in 
the rate of productivity gains seen since 1970 in the United States are by no 
means exceptional. They are even astonishingly similar to those beginning 
at the end of the 19th century, during the whole period of progress with 
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electrification. In the early stages, productivity gains remained slow, only 
accelerating sharply at the time of World War I, before slowing down in the 
second half of the 1920s and then picking up again at the end of the Great 
Depression. Graph 39 calls for one final remark: since the beginning of the 
1990s, unlike what had happened previously, the contribution of TFP and 
that of capital intensity fluctuated in parallel. The increased investment 
effort and the greater contribution of technical progress to productivity gains 
seem to have gone hand-in-hand. While it is true that the American economy 
has not yet derived all the benefits from the current wave of technical 
innovation, more rapid growth in activity and the impulse this would give 
to corporate investment could perhaps enable this to take place.  
6.2 A low-pressure economy 
In order to explain the low level of productivity gains since the beginning of 
the 2010s, Janet Yellen (2016) – who succeeded Ben Bernanke as Chair of the 
Fed at the beginning of 2014 – put forward the hypothesis that the efforts in 
favour of innovation and investment on the part of companies may have 
been held back by the sluggishness of the upturn that followed the Great 
Recession, in which case further growth in total demand and a tighter labour 
market should, by contrast, act as a stimulus to these efforts. By subjecting – 
temporarily, at least – the economy to a ‘high-pressure’ regime, it might be 
possible to accelerate the rate of productivity gains and even provide an 
incentive to those who had given up looking for jobs to return to the labour 
market. Larry Summers suggested in a lecture to the Center on Budget and 
Policy Priorities, paraphrasing Say’s Law, according to which supply creates 
its own demand, that “lack of demand creates its own lack of supply down 
the road in terms of productivity growth”. The problem that has faced the 
US authorities since the beginning of the 2010s is, however, not only 
knowing whether higher ‘pressure’ on the demand side could make it 
possible to raise growth in potential output, but also knowing to what extent 
the levers applied until now – fiscal policy and monetary policy – are still 
capable of regulating this pressure!  
Limited budgetary support 
The recovery that began at the end of 2009 was, as mentioned earlier, the 
weakest of any during the post-war period. This is hardly a surprise. Until 
then all the upturns had been driven by strong growth in residential 
investment and it was difficult to see this being repeated. It was precisely in 
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order to prevent the fall in household borrowing and the collapse of 
residential investment from triggering a deflationary spiral that the federal 
government allowed its deficit to widen during the crisis.  
As early as 2008, the Economic Stimulus Act, signed by George W. 
Bush, provided initial support for spending by households, notably by 
means of a tax credit. However, this support was modest (equivalent to 
barely 1% of GDP) compared with the decline in the flow of their borrowing 
(which between mid-2006 and the beginning of 2009 amounted to no less 
than 13% of GDP) and to the resulting contraction in their spending. The 
bulk of the budget support would take effect in 2009 through the American 
Recovery and Reinvestment Act signed by President Obama. The sums 
involved, for a total of $800 billion, or almost 5% of GDP, were this time more 
substantial and the types of expenditure financed were more diverse. Some 
of them were still aimed at bolstering household consumption, through new 
tax credits and an extension of the period of unemployment benefit; others 
were aimed at stimulating corporate investment and financing public 
investment in training and infrastructure; lastly, almost $150 billion was 
applied to meeting deficits in the budgets of states and local authorities 
whose revenues were being particularly badly affected by the collapse in the 
prices and volumes of real estate transactions. Without this latter transfer 
from the federal government, the cuts exerted in these authorities’ spending 
– the largest ever seen in any post-war recession – would have been higher 
still.  
In parallel, through the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, an 
unprecedented fiscal effort had been launched at the end of 2008 in order to 
consolidate the US financial system. Together, these measures helped to 
stabilise the economy, but there was still the need to re-stimulate activity. 
Despite the rapid fall in benchmark rates (which have been practically zero 
since the winter of 2008), the excesses accumulated before the crisis ruled out 
any hopes of seeing household borrowing pick up at all rapidly. With the 
usual upturn mechanism no longer operative, borrowing by the government 
could have acted as a substitute, but it would have been necessary for the 
budget to become the source, for a few years at least, of an impulse that 
would contribute to the revival of activity, at the cost of a further 
deterioration in the public deficit. The disquiet raised by the already high 
level of government borrowing and the reluctance with regard to the rise in 
public spending explain why fiscal support went no further. Yet again, 
monetary policy became the only lever that could be used to attempt to 
accelerate growth in activity. Its effectiveness had been considerably 
blunted, however.  
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Problems with the transmission of monetary policy 
The 2007 crisis, by profoundly modifying the behaviour of the financial 
system, seriously disrupted the habitual mechanisms for the transmission of 
monetary policy stimuli. In the first place, large numbers of market operators 
were twice shy following the shock they had suffered – for a time, at least. 
Furthermore, in order to prevent the repetition of the excesses that had led 
to the crisis, the authorities obliged operators to adopt more-lasting 
prudence. In 2010, Congress approved the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform 
and Consumer Protection Act, designed to remedy the numerous regulatory 
shortcomings that the crisis had exposed. At the same time, it entrusted the 
Fed with the surveillance of certain shadow banking activities that had 
played an important role in the accumulation of the excess of risk. The start 
of implementation of Basel III further restricted risk-taking behaviour on the 
part of banks. Finally, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, institutions saved from 
bankruptcy at the height of the crisis, were placed under the conservatorship 
of the government and forced to adopt greater caution. All in all, the 
propensity of the US financial system to take risks was reduced and the 
transmission of monetary policy stimuli weakened as a result.  
The behaviour of the agents most sensitive to these impulses, namely, 
households, was affected even more severely by the crisis. The decline in real 
estate prices and the rise in unemployment plunged many recent borrowers 
into a financial situation not easily alleviated by cuts in interest rates. The 
possibility of refinancing fixed-rate mortgages at lower interest rates had 
significantly bolstered activity at the beginning of the 2000s. This time things 
were not so easy. If the price of the mortgaged asset had fallen, a borrower 
wanting to reimburse a relatively recent loan by borrowing at a lower 
interest rate often found it impossible to do so, for lack of being able to put 
up as collateral an asset of sufficient value. At the same time, securitisation 
meant that it was more difficult to restructure loans to borrowers threatened 
with repossession in the way that had operated during the 1930s. Ownership 
of these loans was by now dispersed among all the owners of the securities 
of which these loans were the counterpart. Despite timid government efforts 
to improve them, the financial situations of many US households were set to 
remain precarious for several years and this helped to depress both house 
prices and residential investment.  
An emergency monetary policy 
Faced with this new reality, the Fed had little choice: unable to use 
conventional routes to encourage a rapid upturn in activity, it launched a 
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long-haul policy aimed at underpinning growth, as best it could, until such 
time as the depressive effects of the crisis and of the excesses that preceded 
it were absorbed. For this purpose, it attempted to keep as low as possible, 
not only its policy rates but the entire interest-rate curve, using for this 
purpose unconventional instruments, notably ‘quantitative easing’ (QE). 
This involved, over a period of several years, gradually reducing the 
quantity of long-term bonds that private agents had to hold. On this occasion 
the Fed did not, as it had done in the depth of the crisis, purchase stocks 
whose prices were in free-fall. Instead, it acted at a time when prices had 
recovered somewhat to push them up and hence bring about a deeper fall in 
long-term rates. All in all, as part of two successive programmes, it bought 
between end-2010 and end-2014 more than $2.5 trillion in bonds (equivalent 
to just over one-tenth of the outstanding bonds issued by the Treasury and 
GSEs). This brought mortgage rates down to their lowest ever level. Despite 
this perseverance, the expansion that had begun at the beginning of the 
decade continued as it had begun: at an astonishingly slow rate.  
Desperately weak growth 
Ten years after the start of the major financial crisis, ‘pressure’ in the US 
economy could still not be said to have risen appreciably. Admittedly, given 
the weakness of productivity gains and the fall in the participation rate, 
growth of 2% per year finally brought unemployment practically down to its 
lowest levels. However, inflation continued low. Finally, some faint signs of 
pressure on the labour market began to emerge, in the form of a slight rise in 
the participation rate for the working-age population (largely due, as we 
have seen, to the tendency in the female rate) and the beginnings of a rise, in 
real terms, in the median weekly wage. However, for three-quarters of the 
workers having no higher-education qualification, this rise did no more than 
bring their wages back to where they had been in 2000 – at best! And to reach 
even this result, monetary policy had resorted to extraordinary measures 
and its limitations had been exposed. 
Clearly, the Fed’s efforts had not been entirely in vain. By doing 
everything it could to keep interest rates low, it had enabled American 
households to reduce their debt burden to its lowest proportion of 
disposable income since the beginning of the 1980s. The low interest rates 
had also encouraged household borrowing to pick up again, but in 
conditions that were very different from those prevailing before the crisis. 
With borrowing conditions now more rigorous, mortgages no longer 
accounted for the bulk of the increase in their borrowing, this role being 
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taken over by other types of credit, especially car loans and student loans. In 
both these categories, disquieting signs were starting to emerge. For 
example, the proportion of sub-prime car loans has risen sharply in recent 
years, while student loans, most of which are guaranteed by the government, 
rose precipitously in the aftermath of the crisis, at a time when the cost of 
attending university was also rising. The result was that many newcomers 
to the labour market were carrying relatively high levels of debt.  
Alongside these indicators of saturation of households’ borrowing 
capacity, the side-effects of the monetary policy being implemented were 
also manifesting themselves in other sectors of the economy. Between 2012 
and 2016, investment in commercial real estate grew at an annual rate of 
more than 10% and the prices, adjusted for those of GDP as a whole, returned 
to their high levels of 2007. At the same time, stock market prices were being 
pushed up by the low level of interest rates: in relation to profit expectations, 
the prices of S&P 500 stocks at the end of 2017 were close to those of 20 years 
earlier when Alan Greenspan was making reference to “irrational 
exuberance”. 
6.3 The American model called into question 
The election of Donald Trump revealed the despair felt by a large number of 
Americans as a result of the stagnation of income that accompanied the slow 
return to relative full employment, as well as of the path followed by the US 
economy in recent decades. In his election campaign, Trump proposed a U-
turn regarding immigration and the opening up to international trade. He 
also promised to give the economy back its past dynamism by overturning 
regulations hobbling economic growth, which he promised to stimulate by 
means of tax reform. Unfortunately, it can be doubted whether this 
programme is an effective response to the problems facing the United States 
at the present time. 
Going back on trade liberalisation: no easy task 
The role played by trade liberalisation – a movement that had long been 
advocated by the United States – in the disappearance of millions of jobs has 
already been highlighted. To reverse this liberalisation would nevertheless 
not only be costly but extremely difficult politically. In many sectors, 
commercial flows are now well-established and production chains closely 
integrated – often under the aegis of American firms, who would therefore 
be the first to oppose protectionist measures. Other firms would take a 
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similar attitude for fear of retaliation affecting their market outlets in the 
countries from which the United States seeks protection. Too many firms 
have too much at stake for the new administration to be able to go at all far 
in this direction. It took no more than a few weeks to see the scrapping of the 
Border Tax Adjustment aimed at providing incentives to produce goods on 
US territory rather than importing them. Actively defended during the 
presidential campaign by Wilbur Ross, the new US Secretary of Commerce, 
the proposal was unable to withstand pressures from the mass distribution 
sector, a huge importer of consumer goods! 
The renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) that began in the summer of 2017 also rapidly exposed the 
difficulties and risks of a U-turn. In order to obviate the threat of a lasting 
erosion of US industrial positions similar to that of recent decades, Robert 
Lighthizer, the US trade representative, proposed that the entirety of the 
provisions of the new treaty should be submitted for re-approval every five 
years. Immediately, US firms were up on their hind legs opposing a 
provision that would mean chronic uncertainty regarding the organisation 
of their production chains. The Treaty signed in 1994 had in fact produced 
close interlocking of these chains, both with Canada (for cars, chemical 
products and metalworking) and with Mexico (for cars, apparel, electronic 
goods and machinery). Hampering, let alone unravelling, their functioning 
by imposing customs duties would by no means affect only the firms directly 
concerned. A study of the impact of the disappearance of preferential tariffs 
on the competitiveness and attractiveness of the three countries shows no 
net job creation in any of the cases and, in fact, job losses generally (Walmsley 
& Minor, 2017). The fact that these losses would be relatively smaller in the 
United States than in Mexico and Canada is unlikely to make Congress 
favourable to such a radical change! 
It is in its trade with the People’s Republic of China, however, that the 
US records its largest trade deficit (in the case of Canada and Mexico, the 
integration of production chains has led to relatively intense exchanges but 
relatively modest deficits). Long accused of exchange rate manipulation in 
order to boost exports to the United States, China could normally be 
expected to be the main target of a return to protectionism on the part of the 
United States. But any retaliatory measures would then immediately deprive 
US firms of their access to one of the world’s most promising markets. Here 
again, they would be unlikely to take this lying down. 
The possibility that the United States might be prepared to take the 
risks involved in a trade war still remains, however, given the still high 
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degree of visibility of the social damage caused by trade liberalisation. And 
yet this damage is not due to free trade itself but to a failure to grasp the scale 
and nature of the adjustment it implies on the part of the consenting 
countries. If nothing is done to redistribute the advantages and to ensure that 
labour released in one sector can be employed in another, international trade 
will always inspire rejection! And it is precisely this redistribution and re-
skilling of labour that the United States has proved incapable of 
implementing on a sufficient scale and with sufficient rapidity. 
The supply-side chimera walks again 
The other main plank of the president’s programme was large-scale tax 
reform. Combined with deregulation – mainly environmental and financial 
– this was intended to enable the economy to return to steady growth of 
above 3%. Here again, the principal obstacle was related to feasibility. 
Genuine tax reform is more than a matter of adjusting tax brackets; it also 
involves a redefinition of the tax base itself. The past several decades have 
seen an accumulation of tax loopholes and exemptions whose modification, 
or even abolition, was imperative if tax rates were to be reduced without 
over-jeopardising budget equilibrium. Given the power and high degree of 
organisation of the various pressure groups, the slightest reference to such 
changes was bound to arouse strong resistance, which always requires 
considerable political energy to overcome. They were steam-rolled through 
by a Republican Party anxious to reach a rapid conclusion. The process was 
completed in a matter of weeks, whereas 30 years previously discussions and 
negotiations had taken several long months.  
The previous reform dated back to 1986. Instigated by President 
Reagan with the aim of lifting the economy out of stagflation, it put an end 
to several years of incessant and sometimes chaotic changes to the American 
tax system. The reform proposed by the Republican Party in 2017 had a 
similar objective but the reasoning was different. In 1986, the taxation of 
households had been eased by a reduction in tax rates (the highest marginal 
rate being cut from 50% to 38.5%), while, in order to safeguard budgetary 
equilibrium, taxes on firms had been tightened by the abolition of various 
loopholes (Stewart, 1991). In 2017, it was a reduction in corporation tax – 
from 35% to 21% in the case of the marginal rate – that seems to have been 
the principal concern of the Republican Party. 
Admittedly, the 2017 reform would reduce the tax contribution of 
numerous households, but for most of them the size of the cut was very 
small: the relief resulting from the rearrangement of tax brackets was often 
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accompanied by the loss of various previously granted deductions. The most 
important of these, enabling duties and taxes paid to individual states to be 
deducted from the income taxable at federal level, tended to affect residents 
of richer states, which often had Democratic majorities. Only the best-off 
households seem likely to derive a clear benefit from this reform. It is 
difficult to imagine that activity would be stimulated as a result. These 
households’ income had in fact been growing rapidly since the crisis without 
any acceleration in growth. Nor was there much greater chance, moreover, 
that the cut in corporate tax would provide a lasting stimulus to investment. 
Since the beginning of the 2000s, the share of GDP represented by 
companies’ profits, after tax, had risen continuously to an unprecedented 
level, but even so their productive investment remained practically 
unchanged. For the most part, the rise was spent on higher pay-outs to 
shareholders in the form of share buybacks or dividend distribution (Box 7). 
It is difficult to see how leaving a greater share of profits in their hands could 
have any other result. The companies that will benefit most are those that are 
already the most profitable, often because they have been able to create 
situations of economic rent for themselves. The most likely outcome is 
therefore that dividend payments and share buybacks will further add to the 
financial investments of the recipients.  
At best, inasmuch as it gives firms for a period of five years the 
possibility of deducting the totality of their investment spending from 
taxable income, the reform may give a temporary boost to investment. Its 
impact on the public deficit will be lasting, however. In fact, as mentioned in 
Chapter IV, never since the war has the burden of federal debt been as high 
as at present, and CBO forecasts indicate that the impact of, among other 
things, the ageing of the population and the rising cost of healthcare will 
mean that it will rise even further, by more than 10% of GDP during the 
2020s. And if it fails to trigger the additional growth – and hence the 
additional tax revenue – announced by its promoters, the reform will add a 
few more GDP percentage points to the federal debt by the end of this period. 
No going back to greater social solidarity 
It is difficult to see the ‘pressure’ in the American economy being raised 
again sufficiently to durably increase wages at the lower end of the scale and 
to incite companies, in all sectors, to achieve greater productivity gains. On 
the one hand, the fact that the distribution of income still favours a small 
number of households and firms with a high propensity to save is a factor 
tending to depress activity; on the other, the agents whose growing debt had 
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hitherto tended to counteract this factor – the federal government and the 
large majority of households – are now unable or unwilling to borrow on the 
scale needed to compensate. Of course, the process of regaining through 
protectionist measures the domestic spending ‘given away’ to the rest of the 
world in recent decades could mean an increase in demand for the products 
of American firms. However, to some extent this regaining has already taken 
place: the fall in the oil price (which almost halved between 2007 and 2017) 
and above all the spectacular post-crisis rise in US production of shale oil 
have already considerably reduced the share of domestic spending going to 
the oil-exporters, but still without being sufficient to trigger lasting 
acceleration in growth. It is more difficult to see the market shares lost to 
Mexico and China being recovered. 
Seen in this light, there seem to be few choices open to the United 
States: only improved distribution of income, via public transfers or 
investment, is capable of giving growth sufficient impetus to trigger a lasting 
rise in private investment. The US government could on this occasion 
undertake the modernisation of the country’s infrastructure – social as well 
as physical. President Trump paid considerable attention during his election 
campaign to the need to invest in physical infrastructure of all kinds, with 
the financing left to public-private partnerships (which may or may not see 
the light of day). As for the need to invest in the education and training 
systems, recent years have shown just how glaring this is. The need for 
rationalisation of the healthcare system, whose costs weigh heavily on the 
budgets of both government and households, is also great. 
Political inertia being what it is, there is little chance of seeing the 
United States abandon any time soon its aversion to public intervention. The 
new Administration has in fact taken off in the diametrically opposite 
direction to that described above. The US economy is obviously sufficiently 
powerful to continue for many long years to function at low pressure, as it 
has now done for more than a decade. However, in the short term it is more 
vulnerable to shocks than at any time since the Great Depression. In the 
absence of an ambitious public policy, there is every chance that the slow but 
worrying regression of part of its population will continue. 
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Box 7. Profits and investment by US non-financial firms 
The Federal Reserve’s flow-of-funds tables make it possible to compare the 
evolutions of non-financial firms’ profits and investment spending. Their 
financing requirement, which had been constantly positive from the 1960s to 
the 1990s, was replaced in the mid-2000s by a financing capacity (the 
difference between their retained profits and their investment expenditure, 
net of depreciation). Since the 2007 crisis, this financing capacity, smoothed 
over seven years, has shown a steep rise, reaching 4% of their value added by 
mid-2017 (Graph 41). 
Graph 41. Formation of non-financial firms’ financing capacity or requirement, 
1959-2017 (% of non-financial firms’ value added, smoothed over seven years)  
 
Sources: Federal Reserve and authors’ calculations. 
This change is due in part to the weakness of net investment 
expenditure, which fell appreciably in relation to their value added during the 
1980s and rose only for a brief period during the 1990s – the United States 
economy’s ‘new age’. The fall in plant and equipment prices highlighted in 
Chapter II played a significant role in this respect: between the early 1980s 
and 2017, these prices fell by more than 40% by comparison with GDP prices 
(most of the movement taking place during the 1980s and 1990s). However, 
this factor only partially explains the decline in corporate investment 
expenditure: the growth in the volume of net investment also slowed down, 
further contributing to weaker growth in the total capital stock – and hence 
also in that of capital intensity. Above all, the reduction in investment as a 
share of GDP is insufficient to explain the continual rise in their financing 
capacity that began in the early 2000s, due in the first place to the rise in 
retained profits, a rise that is all the more spectacular in that dividend 
payments (already subtracted from these profits) rose sharply at the same 
time. 
Moreover, dividends are by no means the only payments that were 
made to shareholders. In 1982, “rule 10b-18” modified a provision of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act and enabled companies to buy back their own shares 
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without being accused of share-price manipulation. Since then, the amount of 
these buybacks has steadily risen. Total payments by companies to their 
shareholders – in the form of dividend payments and share buybacks* – have 
accounted for a continuously rising share of their profits, from 25% at the 
beginning of the 1980s to more than 80% in 2017. Despite the unprecedentedly 
high proportion of their value added accounted for by after-tax profits, non-
financial firms – taken as a group, at least – continued to borrow while at the 
same time building up their financial assets. As a result, in mid-2017 they held 
more than $2 trillion in liquid assets or debt securities of various kinds. 
However, the bulk of the growth in their financial assets was due to an 
accumulation of ‘goodwill’ items paid at the time of M&A transactions.  
Observation of the behaviour of certain listed non-financial companies 
provides an additional insight. On average, these companies – accounting for 
the bulk of non-financial companies – distributed most of their profits in the 
form of dividends or share buybacks, while their investment spending 
(excluding R&D) took an ever declining share.** There are nevertheless 
certain notable behavioural differences. That of some firms is very close to the 
average; this is true, for example, of Apple, but also of Pfizer and Boeing, 
which, taking the average of the period 2010-16, distributed the bulk of their 
after-tax profits – sometimes even more – whereas their net investment 
spending was practically zero. By contrast, others such as Walmart (at least 
until the 2007 crisis) invested a substantial portion of their profits. Even in 
these cases, however, the sums allocated to dividend payments and share 
buybacks were substantial. Only a handful of firms – mainly those in the ‘new 
economy’ (Amazon, Alphabet, Tesla) – posted a continual rise in their 
investment spending. Given that their profits were sometimes small or even 
non-existent, some of them, like Tesla, resorted to borrowing or to share issues 
to finance the investment (Graph 42). 
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Graph 42. Profits, dividend payments, share buybacks and net investment spending 
for selected quoted companies (billions of current dollars, smoothed over seven years) 
 
Note: Companies’ investment spending corresponds to their investment net of depreciation 
and does not take into account spending on R&D, which is substantial for many of them 
but treated, as in their own accounts, as current expenditure.  
Sources: Thomson Reuters Datastream and Worldscope. 
__________________________ 
* In the Federal Reserve’s flow-of-funds tables, share purchases linked to M&A operations 
are not distinguished from companies’ buybacks of their own shares.  
** Note that in companies’ own accounts, spending on R&D, which in many cases is 
substantial, is treated as current expenditure and not, as in the national accounts, as 
investment. It has therefore (in contrast to the treatment in the national accounts) already 
been subtracted from companies’ profits. This treatment for accounting purposes makes 
no difference to the gap observed between after-tax profits and investment, which is 
identical to the one that would be calculated using national accounting concepts.
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CONCLUSION 
he American economy seems to be in an impasse, for reasons that we 
have tried to explain in this book. The United States took the step of 
opening its economy to unprecedented competition – that of low-
wage countries – certain that market forces would enable it to withstand the 
consequences. It was all the less able to do so in that technical progress was 
simultaneously giving firms the possibility of replacing men with machines 
in the performance of an increasingly large number of tasks. It takes more 
than the destruction of jobs to create new ones – let alone train the workers 
to fill them. To be effective, ‘creative destruction’ calls for interaction 
between government and markets. Public investment is needed to 
facilitate the reallocation of the ‘liberated’ workforce and the creation of 
new institutions and new forms of transfer are required to enable new 
development-generated needs to manifest themselves. Market forces are 
undoubtedly a formidable source of dynamism but they are also myopic: 
in the absence of public guidance, US experience shows that there is 
every chance that they will destroy jobs much more rapidly than they 
create them, the result being upward pressure on unemployment and a 
decline in the remuneration of a substantial number of jobs. In 
attempting to counter this pressure, the only reaction of the authorities 
has been to try to maintain full employment, the cornerstone of the 
American social pact. The method used has been steadfast – and for 
many years remarkably effective – recourse to the instruments of macro-
economic policy. These instruments have now revealed their limitations. 
The coming years will show what lessons will have been learned by the 
United States. In the meantime, its experience could surely be of use to 
other advanced countries that are also confronted with intense 
international competition and unceasing technical progress.  
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The American Economy
A European view
Anton Brender 
Florence Pisani
Each year, 25% of the world’s output is produced by less than 5% of the planet’s population. The juxtaposition of these two figures gives an idea of the power 
of the American economy. Not only is it the most productive among the major 
developed economies, but it is also a place where new products, services and 
production methods are constantly being invented. Even so, for all its efficiency 
and its capacity for innovation, the United States is progressively manifesting 
worrying signs of dysfunction. Since the 1970s, the American economy has 
experienced increasing difficulty in generating social progress. Worse still, over 
the past twenty years, signs of actual regression are becoming more and more 
numerous. How can this paradox be explained? Answering this question is the 
thread running throughout the chapters of this book. 
Anton Brender and Florence Pisani, economists with Candriam Investors 
Group, offer the reader an overview of the history and structure of the American 
economy, guided by a concern to shed light on the problems it faces today.
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